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This thesis investigates the utility of using the Compound Remote Associate
(CRA) problem, developed by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003), in investigating the
neural correlates insight. It is uncertain to what extent CRA problems are insight
problems. In Experiment 1, I performed a protocol analysis of people solving CRA
problems and found that CRA problems can and should be used to investigate insight.
However, certain considerations should be taken. Particularly, researchers should
separate problems solved with insight when the solution is the first thing considered
(immediate-insight) from problems solved with insight when the solution is obtained
after at least some deliberation (delayed-insight). Parsing insight solutions into separate
categories, I performed a functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) experiment.
The results suggest a distinct difference in processing between delayed and immediate
insight solutions. The results shed light into possible irregularities in prior studies and
provide important considerations for future research on insight problem solving.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Problem solving enables us to discover solutions to questions. Sometimes,
however, we reach an impasse, or road block, in the problem solving process. We may
realize there is some flaw in our efforts, and the solution may seem unattainable, but the
source of our error remains hidden. We may contemplate for a long period of time until,
all of the sudden, the answer seems obvious. This phenomenon has been termed insight,
and is loosely defined as achieving a solution without knowing where the solution came
from. Insight has been studied at least since the classic two-string problem study was
conducted by Maier (1931). Maier tied two strings to a ceiling far enough apart so that a
person could not grasp one string while holding onto the other. The objective was to tie
the two strings together using any objects in the room for help. Insight occurred when
people saw a wrench, or some other object, as a weight instead of as its normal function
(a leverage tool). The weight can then be used as a pendulum to swing the rope within
grabbing distance. However, even given this history of study, the definition of insight and
what kinds of problems should be used to study insight remains controversial.
Many types of problems have been used to study insight. Classic insight
problems have been used extensively, and sometimes the reason is solely based on the
fact that they have previously been used to study insight (Weisberg, 1995). With the
emergence of advanced neuroimaging techniques (e.g., functional Magnetic Resonance
1

Imaging [fMRI], Electroencephalography [EEG], etc.), and the great amount of time it
takes to solve (if at all) complex, classic insight problems, new problems and paradigms
have emerged to investigate insight (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Bowden, JungBeeman, Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; Luo & Knoblich, 2007; Razumnikova, 2007). One
specific problem type that has posed useful, and is highly advocated, is the compound
remote associate (CRA) problem (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007). CRA problems
consist of three words. The task is to produce a single fourth word that can be combined
with each of the first three words to form new compound words or common phrases
(discussed in detail below). CRA problems are solved much quicker than classic insight
problems, and individual problems can still be solved with insight regardless of learning
effects over multiple trials (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007). However, the question
remains whether CRA problems are insight problems.
I assessed the utility of using CRA problems to investigate insight so that I may
successfully use fMRI to investigate the neural correlates of insight. An individual CRA
problem is rated as being solved with or without insight by the problem solver on a
forced choice scale. However, the solver may report insight just because they have the
option. Though differences have been found between insight-CRA problems and
noninsight-CRA problems (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007; Bowden et al., 2005; JungBeeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008; Kounios et al. 2006), we need more empirical
evidence that CRA problems can be used to study insight. Bowden and Jung-Beeman
(2007) only briefly discuss the issue. Specifically, evidence is needed to show that CRA
problems can be solved with insight, and that there are characteristic differences between
solving one with insight and solving one without insight. If CRA problems can be used to
2

study insight, the reliability of prior experiments that used CRA problems will increase. I
implemented a verbal protocol analysis of people’s CRA problem solving efforts to find
if CRA problems solved with insight exhibit more characteristics of insight, as it is
traditionally defined, than problems solved without insight. If CRA problem solutions,
labeled as insight by participants, do exhibit properties of insight then I can confidently
follow up the protocol analysis with an fMRI experiment investigating the neural
correlates of insight. In Chapter I of this thesis, I first detail the components of insight to
create a working definition of insight, and then I analyze the problems used in prior
insight research and discuss what the CRA task is and whether CRA problems do elicit
insight, and, finally, discuss the neural correlates of insight found in prior studies. In
Chapter II, I report the results from the protocol analysis (Experiment 1). In Chapter III, I
report the results from the fMRI experiment (Experiment 2). Chapter IV is a discussion
of what the results tell us about insight problem solving and the potential use of CRA
problems in investigating insight.

What is Insight?: Components of Insight
It would be difficult to develop a single definition of insight based on the
experience people have. Different processes may be used that still lead to the experience
of insight and individual people may use different processes to solve the same problem
(e.g., Schooler, Fallshore, & Fiore, 1995). Schooler et al. suggests that insight should be
understood by what happens rather than what is experienced. The solver moves from an
initial state (not knowing how to solve a problem) to a goal state (knowing how to solve
the problem).

3

It is important to distinguish what insight is because there are many perspectives
that seem to share ideas but are actually different. There seems to be general agreement
that insight solutions differ from noninsight solutions (Bowden et al., 2005). Noninsight
solutions are straightforward in the approach and solvers have a distinct representation of
how to achieve the solution. Solvers have a path that can be followed from initial state to
goal state. Insight solutions cannot be derived by a person’s original representation of the
problem. Some phenomenological features are unique to insight. Insight solutions often
appear from nowhere and solvers experience an affective response of suddenness and
surprise (“Aha!” experience), sometimes resulting after an impasse, and involve
processes of overcoming the impasse that solvers cannot report (Bowden & Beeman,
1998; Bowden et al., 2005; Metcalfe, 1986; Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1995; Seifert,
Meyer, Davidson, Patalano, & Yaniv, 1995). The key components of insight are fixation,
impasse, restructuring, and the “Aha!” experience.

Approaching a Problem
People approach a problem with an initial representation of how to solve it.
Research, from the perspective that problem solvers have a “prepared-mind,” suggests
that the cognitive control mechanisms being employed prior to even encountering a
problem affect the problem solving process (Kounios et al., 2008; Kounios et al., 2006;
Seifert et al., 1995). Specific brain areas are more active before seeing a problem that is
ultimately solved with insight than without insight (discussed in more detail below;
Kounios et al., 2008; Kounios et al., 2006). People have a general bias towards certain
problem solving process due to repeated usage of that process. Sometimes called
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Einstellung, people can develop a preference for longer, more reliable, and more familiar
processes for solving a problem rather than the less familiar, but easier, insight problem
solving process (Ohlsson, 1992). The automaticity gained from extensive practice with
noninsight problem solving process could account for why people do not use the less
practiced process of insight problem solving.
The objects, operators, and constraints of a problem produce multiple sources of
difficulty for any problem, hindering the correct solution by insight problem solving.
Kershaw and Ohlsson (2004) state at least three difficulties that fit with this assumption:
problem perception (how people see the problem), prior knowledge (mental set), or
processing of the information. The constraints problem solvers put upon a problem when
they first see it lead them to an incorrect representation of the problem. Other reasons for
forming an incorrect representation may be due to cognitive processes and biases that a
problem solver has prior to approaching the problem (Kounios et al., 2008; Kounios et
al., 2006; Seifert et al., 1995). People have learned problem solving strategies that they
bring with them to a problem. Mental set can be described as the solver’s most
appropriate, usual, and optimal solution to the problem at hand (Öllinger, Jones, &
Knoblich, 2008; Wiley, 1998). Wiley (1998) found that people with high “domain”
knowledge (i.e., expertise in the subject matter of the problem) were less likely to solve
problems requiring insight than people with low domain knowledge when the problems
were designed such that the domain knowledge interfered with the solution. Approaching
a problem, the solver will bring with them unwarranted assumptions of how to solve the
problem based on prior experience (Weisberg & Alba, 1981). As the solver begins to
process the information in a problem he or she may become fixated on the wrong objects
5

in the problem, the relations of the objects, or the operators available. The solution
procedure being used will not lead to solution and thus a moment of impasse is reached.

Impasse
An impasse occurs when a person cannot find a solution to an answer after some
effort. Paralleling research on mental set and fixation, Schooler et al. (1995) said that
impasses are formed from overemphasizing irrelevant cues and underemphasizing
relevant cues. The impasse forms as a factor of constrained thinking. As Weisberg and
Alba (1981) suggest, a solution requires either a completely original approach
(conscious) or a novel combination of diverse bits of information through remote
associations in memory (unconscious). The constraints, posed on a given problem, inhibit
the correct representation but can be overcome by unconscious spreading activation.
Impasses may occur because an initial incorrect representation of the problem must be
changed to reach a solution.
The research on incubation provides one option for overcoming an impasse
(Dorfman, 1991; Dorfman, Shames, & Khilstrom, 1996; Öllinger et al., 2008; Segal,
2004; Smith, 1995). Incubation is a moment of time in which the problem solver
consciously stops the problem solving process. Segal (2004) found that introducing a
break after an impasse has been reached promoted subsequent solving of the problem
with insight; and, no unconscious processes occurred during this break. However,
forgetting (e.g., Smith, 1995), priming (e.g., Langley & Jones, 1988; Seifert et al., 1995),
or a combination of the two (Kaplan, 1989) are a few processes that may occur during
incubation. Dorfman (1991) showed that incubation periods correlated with achieving
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solutions to problems with insight, and that some sort of unconscious processing (e.g.,
spreading activation, autonomous activation, or interactive activation) occurred during
incubation.
If a solver does not reach an impasse, then the solution is derived through a series
of steps, involving smooth progress toward solution, and no experience of insight will
occur. Therefore, it is expected that people should exhibit higher rates of impasse for
solutions derived by insight than noninsight.

Restructuring
The unconscious process of changing ones representation of a problem is known
as restructuring. From the Gestalt perspective, insight occurs when a problem is solved
through restructuring (Weisberg, 1995). Weisberg specifies that restructuring can be
defined as a change in the thinker’s representation of the problem, consisting of objects in
the problem, relations among the objects, operators that the thinker has available to apply
to the objects, and the goal or solution to be obtained. Gick and Lockhart (1995) do not
explicitly use the term “restructuring” but do agree that a change must occur between
initial solving attempts and the solving attempts that lead to the correct solution. Luo and
Knoblich (2007) believe that an experimental insight problem must elicit restructuring.
Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, and Parker (1990) provide a suggestion for how
insight may occur. They propose that people are initially guided to coherence of the
problem. By processing information, a person may unconsciously activate relevant
mnemonic networks and then integrate the plausible representation of the problem into
consciousness as the accumulated activation crosses a threshold of awareness. The
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suddenness of insight is experienced as relevant information needed to solve a problem
breaks into conscious thought causing the solution to be seen almost immediately. There
is a gradual accrual of relevant information, possibly along with the inhibition of
irrelevant information, that it is purely unconscious, which guides people to the correct
representation of the problem. Bower’s claim is that the solution is intuitive but does not
necessarily involve a re-representation of the problem space. His theory of intuition does
not tell us how a person would break from an impasse and have an insight through
restructuring, but rather that restructuring may be a continuous, largely unconscious
process rather than a result of a discontinuity in processing. However, Ohlsson (1992),
Luo and Knoblich (2007), and Öllinger et al. (2008), to name a few, would agree that
conscious reformulations of the problem can bring the answer suddenly into view.
Bowers’ research does not tell us about the processing required for insight other than it is
unconscious. Whether conscious or unconscious, continuous or discontinuous,
restructuring should occur in order to move from initial incorrect representation of the
problem to a more coherent/correct representation, which may lead to sudden insight if
the answer is obviously correct and requires little to no validation.
Öllinger et al. (2008) state that insight occurs when a problem cannot be solved
through previously used solution methods and the solver suddenly realizes that the
solution requires different solution methods (restructuring occurs). When insight occurs,
the solution will be seen in consciousness because the representational shift of the
problem brings the answer into view. Because correct restructuring will lead to the
solution, the solution will be available right away. Ohlsson (1992) suggested that the
change in representation of the problem must bring the goal state (solution) within the
8

horizon (how many steps, into the future, a person can see) of the mental look-ahead (or
internal search of the problem space for where one is and the consequences of thinking in
this space). The distinction here is that insight occurs at restructuring but only when the
answer is quickly and easily available.
Ohlsson (1992) breaks restructuring into three parts: elaboration, re-encoding, and
constraint relaxation. Elaboration means that people extend or enrich the current problem
representation in order to move to a representation that leads to a correct solution.
Elaboration can occur by noticing elements of the problem that were not initially
encoded. In elaboration, a person adds missing information without revising or deleting
existing information. Long-term memory may be critical for this as adding to the
representation requires retrieval of information from long-term memory which inhibits
the old representation in short-term memory (e.g., selective forgetting, from Simon, 1977,
as discussed by Langley & Jones, 1988). Sometimes the initial representation is
completely wrong and adding to the efforts will not bring about the solution. In this case,
re-encoding is necessary. When people re-encode, they abandon one or more
components (or interpretations) of the current representation in order to interpret the
objects/operators in a new light. Through re-encoding the problem solver can form a new
representation, see different aspects of the problem, and possibly even apply new
operators to these new objects. Constraint relaxation occurs as one sees the goal of the
problem in a new light. The goal, or solution, to be achieved is constrained by the objects
and operators of the problem. After problem solvers relax their ideas of how the objects
can be used or relax their ideas of what the problem is asking they can see the problem
differently. The problem solver can then use different objects and operators that are
9

available in long-term memory or see a novel way to approach, and solve, the problem.
Key differences are that elaboration and re-encoding “operate on the representation of the
problem situation (the ‘givens’), while” constraint relaxation “operates on the
representation of the goal (the ‘sought’)” (Ohlsson, 1992, p. 16). People can only add
new information to the representation when elaborating whereas people back up and try
something differently with the same information when re-encoding.
Schooler et al. (1995) describes breaking an impasse as reducing inappropriate
cues and increasing appropriate cues by deemphasizing inappropriate problem elements
(forgetting, changing contexts, accessing appropriate problem elements, environmental
cues, unconscious retrieval). The ideas are similar to those of Ohlsson’s (1992)
restructuring elements. Based on the literature, it is expected that insight problems should
require higher rates of restructuring than noninsight problems, and that restructuring
should follow an impasse.

The “Aha!” Experience
Some research has described insight by the problem solvers’ unique experience
(Gick & Lockhart, 1995; Kaplan & Simon, 1990; Schooler et al., 1995). The experience
develops from the sudden emergence of the correct solution to a problem in
consciousness (Ohlsson, 1992; Schooler et al., 1995). The experience is often
characterized as sudden and surprising, unconscious—people cannot often report how
they came about the answer, and unintended—the solver does not intentionally try to
solve the problem through insightful processes, or sometimes may not be trying at all, but
the solution is attained (Bowden et al., 2005; Ohlsson, 1984; Öllinger et al., 2008).
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Sometimes referred to as the illumination stage (Smith, 1995), the “Aha!” experience is
the moment a problem solver feels the suddenness of surprise.
Gick and Lockhart (1995) note that the feeling of surprise is attributable to the
difference between the initial representation of the problem and the representation needed
to correctly solve the problem. The feeling of suddenness is attributable to the
straightforwardness of the correct representation to elicit the correct solution (Gick &
Lockhart). The information people have at insight comes all at once into consciousness
rather than as a gradual accrual of information (Metcalfe, 1986). Metcalfe used feelings
of warmth (FOW) ratings (ratings of how close one feels to the solution) to asses the
suddenness of solutions in insight problem solving, and found that insight problems elicit
initial, low feelings of warmth (being far away from the answer) with the greatest
increase right before solution. Conversely, noninsight problem solving exhibits a more
gradual increase, in FOW, from initial state to goal state. The sudden increase in FOW
ratings for insight solutions is evidence that solving a problem with insight brings the
solution abruptly into awareness and that some sort of representation change, or
restructuring, must have occurred.

Summary
Insight can thus be defined as a process of moving from an initial state to a goal
state, where the correct representation is discovered after reaching an impasse, and the
solution appears as sudden and surprising. During problem solving, a person’s initial
efforts will not lead to a solution and the solver will usually reach an impasse. Impasses
are often due to mental set, fixation, or Einstellung. Impasses can be overcome by a
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process of restructuring, or changing the problem representation, which leads to a
suppression of irrelevant information and an activation of relevant information until a
useful representation is constructed. The correct representation rapidly reveals the
solution, and the problem solver experiences a feeling of delight, satisfaction, and maybe
even relief (i.e., the “Aha!” moment). The definition of insight reported here should be
taken into account when determining whether the type of problem being used in an
experiment is solvable with insight.

Problems Used for Insight Research
Many different problems have been used to study insight. These problems all
have different solution methods and thus elicit many different ways of reaching an
impasse and overcoming that impasse. Also, some problems can be solved only through
insightful means while others can be solved with or without insight (Bowden & JungBeeman, 2007; Bowden et al., 2005; Weisberg, 1995). Classic insight problems may
present difficulties in studying processes involved in insight through newer techniques—
such as neuroimaging and priming paradigms (Bowden et al., 2005).

Classic Insight Problems
Many classic insight problems have been used to study insight (such as those in
Isaak & Just, 1995) and attaining solution has been the sole basis that insight has been
achieved (Bowden et al., 2005; Weisberg, 1995). This is misleading because many
problems can be solved with or without insight (e.g., the farmer problem; discussed by
Weisberg, 1995). Weisberg classifies problems that can be solved with insight only as
“pure insight” problems and those that can be solved through insight and noninsight
12

processes as “hybrid” problems. For hybrid problems, it may be important to classify
whether a problem was solved with insight or noninsight processes by asking people
whether the solution was obtained through insight or noninsight (e.g., insight ratings;
Bowden et al., 2005; Kounios et al., 2008) and by assessing whether the insight came by
restructuring (Weisberg, 1995).
Classic insight problems are often very difficult and only a few problems (if any)
can be solved in a single experimental session (Bowden et al., 2005). To increase power
into the analysis of insight problem solving, Bowden et al. (2005) and Bowden and JungBeeman (2007) suggest using larger sets of problems, each individually solved quickly
(within a minute) and that can be solved with or without insight. Control over differences
between problem types is achieved and the processes involving noninsight solutions
versus insight solutions can be better analyzed. Analysis of the processes used in insight
versus noninsight problem solving can be made with the combination of similar problems
and subjective reports of the experience of insight. Many scientists have thus relied on a
simpler problem, the CRA problem (or a form of them), to look at the components of
insight (Bowden & Beeman, 1998; Bowden et al., 2005; Bowers et al., 1990; JungBeeman et al., 2004; Razumnikova, 2007; Wiley, 1998).

Compound Remote Associate Problems
The CRA problems, created by Bowden and Jung-Beeman (1998; 2003), is an
extension of the remote associates task (RAT) created by Mednick (1962). CRA
problems involve finding the one word that can form a compound word with each of
three different words. For example, if three words—tree, sauce, and big—are presented,
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the solution is apple. The RAT was originally used to assess creativity, and the solution
word is associated with the problem words in three different ways: synonymous words,
formation of a compound word, and semantic association (Bowden & Jung-Beeman,
2007). The correct solution word, however, must be formed by an associative link
between disparate words and not by “rules of logic, concept formation, or problem
solving” (Mednick, 1962, p. 227). Rules of logic, concept formation, and problem solving
might actually inhibit the connection of disparate words making the solver unable to see
the contiguity between elements. Because of the inconsistencies in how the solution word
is mapped to the target words, Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003) expanded the RAT to
include 144 items that provide consistency in the task. The solution word for each set of
target words is associated in the same manner, through formation of a compound word.
CRA problems can be solved with insight or by noninsight (through trial and error).
Because the CRA problem is a hybrid-type problem, using personal, subjective ratings of
whether a person achieved insight or not (on a 3-point scale: Noninsight, Other, and
Insight) is the best way to assess whether an individual CRA problem is an insight
problem or not (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2007).
When solving CRA problems people often experience the affective component of
insight by self-report ratings of the “Aha!” experience, they cannot report the processing
leading to solution, the problem often misdirects the problem solver, and “performance
on the original RAT reliably correlates with success on classic insight problems
(Schooler & Melcher, 1995; P. I. Dallob & R. L. Dominowski, personal communication)”
(Bowden et al., 2005, p. 324). These are good reasons to assume CRA problems can and
should be used to study insight. However, because CRA problems are hybrid problems,
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rated insight or noninsight by the solver, and are such short and simple problems, there is
concern about their use to study insight.

Are CRA Problems Insight Problems?
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2007) offer a couple of reasons why CRA should be
used to study insight. The processing is often unreportable, the problems misdirect (or
fail to direct) retrieval processes, people experience the “Aha!”, and they appear to
include the same component processes critical for insight. A critical component left out in
Bowden and Jung-Beeman’s description is the process of restructuring. A problem should
be considered an insight problem if it misdirects, leads to an impasse, requires some sort
of restructuring or re-combination of diverse bits, and involves unreportable processes
leading to solution, resulting in an affective “Aha!” experience.
In the Experiment 1, a verbal protocol analysis was used to study people’s
attempts to solve CRA problems. Subjective responses to whether a person has solved a
problem via insight, noninsight, or by some other/unknown mean were used to
distinguish insight problems from noninsight problems. For insight problems, and not
noninsight problems, I expect that solvers will reach an impasse resulting in at least one
form of restructuring. I also examined problems that involve no restructuring as people
may still rate the experience as insight because it was surprising, but in fact, no
restructuring occurred.
Concurrent verbalization of cognitive processing has been shown to inhibit
solving a problem with insight (Schooler, Ohlsson, & Brooks, 1993). This verbal
overshadowing effect may be because verbalization may increase demands of noninsight
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problem solving processes making it harder to access insight processes (Ericsson &
Simon, 1980; Schooler et al., 1993). However, Fleck and Weisberg (2004) found that
verbalizing does not totally inhibit insightful solutions and that verbal protocols may be
used as data. Verbalizing increases demands to short-term and working memory
(Ericsson & Simon, 1980). Because CRA problems are verbal problems, verbalization
should likely reduce the solution rate regardless of whether the problem is solved with
insight or noninsight. Problems that are verbalized should have a lower solution rate and
fewer problems solved with insight than problems that are not verbalized. If problems
reported to be solved with insight are different from problems reported to be solved
without insight then the CRA problem can reliably be used to study insight. Like other
insight problems verbalization of CRA problems should show a verbal overshadowing
effect. Generating a larger amount of new candidate solutions means that a person is
likely making a broader connection of ideas. Because insight requires overcoming
fixation people should generate more new solution candidates for problems solved with
insight than problems solved with noninsight. I expect higher rates of impasse and more
restructuring processes evident in solutions using insight that are not evident in solutions
using noninsight processes (as determined by a person’s subjective experience given by
insight ratings). Understanding the characteristics of CRA problem solving will pose
useful in understanding and investigating the neural correlates of insight and whether
insight and noninsight problem solving involve differential processing components.
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What are the Neural Correlates of Insight?
Insight has been viewed by some as involving a “Special-Process” different from
processes used for noninsight problem solving and by others as involving the same
processes as noninsight problem solving, or “Business-as-Usual” (Bowden et al., 2005;
Davidson, 1995; Schooler et al., 1995). The view of insight being a special process
receives much confirmation from both behavioral and neuroimaging research (Bowden &
Beeman, 1998; Fiore & Schooler, 1998; Jung-Beeman et al., 2004; Kounios et al., 2008;
Kounios et al., 2006; Luo & Knoblich, 2007; Luo & Niki, 2003; Pobric, Mashal, Faust, &
Lavidor, 2008; Razumnikova, 2007; Reverberi, Toraldo, D’Agostini, & Skrap, 2005).
Fiore and Schooler (1998) argue that the Right Hemisphere (RH) plays a critical
role in creative problem solving. In particular, Fiore and Schooler provide evidence that
the RH is essential in avoiding perseveration, or overcoming fixation. The RH is also
advantageous for accessing alternative interpretations, priming distant associates (objects
that don’t seem to have any close relationship), and processing a wider spectrum of
problem elements, contributing to restructuring. The Left Hemisphere (LH) provides for
a more fine grained analysis of problem elements, contributing to fixation. Specifically,
using nine insight problems and the fact that information presented in the left visual field
is activated more quickly in the RH and information presented in the right visual field is
activated more quickly in the LH, Fiore and Schooler found that people solved more
problems following left visual field, RH (lvf-RH) presentation of a hint than right visual
field, LH (rvf-LH) presentation of a hint. The RH is more suitable for recognizing critical
problem elements in the environment, but the verbal processes in the LH are also
required to solve a problem by insight. Indeed, Razumnikova (2007) found that
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interaction between the LH and the RH is critical for solving problems with insight, but
the RH is particularly useful for solving a problem with insight.
Bowden and Beeman (1998) used a priming paradigm to examine the RH
advantages for insight problem solving. As people attempted to solve a problem, a
solution word or unrelated target word was presented to the lvf-RH or the rvf-LH and the
problem solver was required to read it aloud. People responded to solution words faster
for the lvf-RH presented words than the rvf-LH presented words, showing that the
solution to a problem was primed (more easily accessible) in the RH. For unsolved
problems, the solution word was only primed in the lvf-RH. The information here
suggests that there is greater activation of solution-relevant information in the RH for
insight problems.
Pobric et al. (2008) used repetitive Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (rTMS) to
impair a person’s RH. By placing a magnet on the skull, the brain regions in the
immediate area are temporarily “short-circuited.” The effects of rTMS on the right
posterior superior temporal sulcus (rPSTS) were disruptions in the processing of novel
but not conventional metaphors (Talairach coordinates: 49, -28, 4). When the left inferior
frontal gyrus was disrupted, the processing of literal word pairs and conventional but not
novel metaphors was inhibited. The results confirm that the RH may be important for
integrating the meaning of seemingly unrelated ideas, a component necessary for solution
to a CRA problem.
Using fMRI, Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) found that activity in the right
hemisphere anterior superior temporal gyrus (RH-aSTG) showed significant increase
during insight problem solving as opposed to noninsight problem solving, and that the
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area was active throughout problem solving (Talairach coordinates: 44, -9, -9). The RHaSTG coordinates found in Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) are near the coordinates of the
rPSTS found in Pobric et al. (2008). Similarly, Luo and Niki (2003) found an increase in
activity in the right hippocampus (Talairach coordinates: 36, -16, -14) upon seeing a
solution to unsolved, Japanese riddle problems. Frontal and temporal regions were also
more highly activated. The area described here as the right hippocampus (which lies
close to the RH-aSTG and the rPSTS described above) may be involved in seeing a
connection between disparate concepts. Luo and Niki looked at activation as a difference
between seeing an unsolved problem and then seeing the answer. The paradigm might
not be truly highlighting areas crucial for solving a problem with insight. Areas of
activation for insight, in the frontal and temporal regions, are also supported by the
research of Subramaniam, Kounios, Parrish, and Jung-Beeman (2009), Jung-Beeman et
al. (2004), and Kounios et al. (2006).
Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) argues that “within the network of cortical areas
required for problem solving, different components are engaged or emphasized when
solving with versus without insight” (p. 507) . Kounios et al. (2006) found that, prior to
encountering a problem, increased activation in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), the
posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and the middle and superior temporal gyrus (M/STG)
predicted solving a solution with insight versus without. The signal was stronger in the
PCC and M/STG for insight solutions actually due to a decrease in signal strength for
noninsight solutions. The results indicate that general preparatory mechanisms guide the
problem solver toward problem-solving strategies: the ACC may be exhibiting increased
readiness to monitor for competing responses and apply more cognitive control. Control
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is needed to suppress extraneous thoughts, select solution spaces or strategies, and/or to
shift attention (Kounios et al., 2006). Subramaniam et al. (2009) found that positive affect
(being in a positive mood/not anxious) correlated with increased activity in the dorsal
ACC and was also more highly active for insight problems than noninsight problems. In
support of the theory that the ACC and DLPFC are part of a cognitive control network,
Reverberi et al. (2005) found that patients with lesions to the lateral frontal cortex solved
an insight problem (the most difficult matchstick arithmetic problem) twice as often as
people without lesions (82% for lesion patients vs. 43% for people without lesions),
suggesting a cognitive control mechanism biased for noninsight problem solving in the
dorso-lateral, pre-frontal cortex (DLPFC). In fact, Chein and Schneider (2005) and Cole
and Schneider (2007) identified the ACC and DLPFC as critical components of a
network of cognitive control mechanisms. The DLPFC was implicated in working
memory processes and task maintenance (Cole & Schneider). The DLPFC, in
maintaining task-relevant information (or constraining the problem space), may
contribute to fixation, which is why patients could solve the matchstick problem more
often without it. The ACC becomes active as a preparatory mechanism indicating the
anticipation to need more cognitive control (Cole & Schneider). The ACC may contribute
to restructuring as a result of attention monitoring.
Anderson (2007) maps a number of brain areas reflecting activity for each of
eight different modules outlined within the ACT-R theory. A few of these modules may
be necessary for CRA problem solving and some may play a larger role in insight
processing than noninsight processing. The modules that might show activation
differences between insight and noninsight are the goal module (located in the ACC), the
20

imaginal module (located in the Parietal Lobe), and the declarative module (located in the
prefrontal cortex). Noninsight may impose a greater resource demand in the prefrontal
cortex as a person actively searches the problem space and retrieves information from
memory. Insight requires changing the representation of the problem. Greater activation
in the Parietal Lobe may facilitate insight because of the greater effort needed to change
the representation of a problem. The ACC, associated with cognitive control, may be
more active for insight as a solver monitors a larger space of the problem resulting in
greater response conflict among competing responses.
The neural correlates of insight problem solving may involve similar process to
noninsight problem solving. However, some areas may be more associated with
processes leading to insight. Prior to seeing a problem, specific cortical networks may
influence the type of problem-solving strategy employed. The influence may lead to
recruitment of processes in the RH more conducive to finding connections between
disparate ideas. During restructuring, it is plausible to see a decrease in activation of
network areas involved with noninsight problem solving and an increase in areas
involved in insight problem solving or, alternatively, just a greater response to insight
than noninsight solutions. Also, some areas may show a significant decrease in activation
for insight than noninsight, possibly reflecting a relaxation of constraints. In Experiment
2, I expect to find distinct networks of activation for solutions derived by insight different
from noninsight solutions. Characteristic differences between insight and noninsight
CRA problem solving found in Experiment 1 facilitated the design of Experiment 2,
where I attempted to replicate and extend prior fMRI studies of CRA problem solving.
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Summary
There are a number of characteristics that are more associated with insight than
noninsight problem solving. Insight is inhibited by fixation and mental set, involves
reaching an impasse, overcoming an impasse by restructuring, and an affective response
to a solution that is sudden, unconscious, and unreportable. Noninsight problem solving
is a reportable process involving smooth-progress toward solution. Many classic insight
problems present difficulties in studying insight. Therefore, simpler problems, such as the
CRA problem, might prove to be useful for insight research. Solutions to CRA problem
are often characterized by an “Aha!” experience, moments of impasse from misdirection,
unreportable processes, and involving components of insight found in classic insight
problems (Bowden & Beeman, 2007). In Experiment 1 I characterized differences
between insight and noninsight CRA problem solving by analyzing participants’ verbal
protocols. In Experiment 2, I performed an fMRI experiment investigating the neural
correlates of insight by expanding upon prior experiments (i.e., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004
and Subramaniam et al., 2009).
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CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENT 1 – BEHAVIORAL STUDY

In Experiment 1, I expected a verbal overshadowing effect, more new candidate
solutions, and higher rates of impasse and restructuring evident in insight solutions and
not noninsight solutions. If CRA problems are insight problems then they may be reliably
used in Experiment 2 (a neuroimaging analysis of insight processing).

Method

Participants
Participants were 31 undergraduates enrolled in a psychology course at
Mississippi State University. All participants were native English speakers. Participants
received course credit for their participation.

Design
The design was a 2 (Task: Verbalization, No Verbalization) x 3 (Problem-Type:
Insight, Noninsight, Other) within-subject factorial design. Problem-Type was measured
by the subjective ratings given by the participant, rather than manipulated, which made
this study a quasi-experiment.
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Materials
The task, described as word association problems to participants, consisted of a
set of 66 CRA problems taken from a larger set of 144 normed CRA items developed by
Bowden and Jung-Beeman (2003). Problems were chosen based on information from a
baseline study at Mississippi State University using all 144 problems. Problems with the
highest solution rates that had been solved with insight, on average, half of the time were
included in the set. Six of the problems from the set were used for the practice trials.
Thus, 60 problems were presented in random order and randomly assigned to Task
condition for each participant (problems used can be found in Appendix A). The
problems were displayed on a 17-in. computer monitor and answers were given by typing
on a QWERTY keyboard. The task procedure was designed using E-Prime software
(Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002). Concurrent verbal protocols were obtained
via headset and recorded using E-Prime.

Procedure
Participants were run individually. After receiving informed consent, participants
were instructed on the task objectives and given descriptions of the differences for rating
a problem with Insight, Noninsight, or Other (necessary for adequate, subjective ratings
of insight). The experimenter answered any questions (instructions can be found in
Appendix B). The experimenter started the experiment on the computer and the
participants were instructed to read the directions. After reading the directions, specific
task instructions were given depending on the Task condition for each participant.
Participants were counterbalanced between Task conditions so that half experienced the
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verbalization task first and the other half experienced the no verbalization task first. For
the verbalization condition, participants were instructed on how to verbalize their
thoughts during problem solving efforts based on the think-aloud instructions found in
the appendix of Ericsson and Simon (1993). Participants who were asked to think aloud
first were given instructions and training in how to verbalize their thoughts before the
first task and told that they did not have to think aloud anymore right before the second
task. If the first task was to solve problems without thinking aloud then participants were
asked if they had any questions and allowed to continue and think-aloud instructions
were given after completing the no-verbalization task.
Participants were given three practice CRA problems before each verbalization
condition to make sure that they understood the difference in response items for rating a
problem (Insight, Noninsight, and Other), were verbalizing correctly, and understood the
task requirements. The practice problems also helped to reduce some carryover effect
providing all participants with some prior experience with CRA problems before the
main task. Participants began the CRA task by pressing a button. The problem words
were presented for a maximum 30 seconds. For each set of words, participants attempted
to produce a solution word that would form a compound word with each of the three
words displayed on the screen. Participants could give a solution at any time during the
30 second interval by typing their answer. If the given solution was incorrect they could
continue work on the problem until time ran out. Upon providing a correct solution,
within the time limit, participants were prompted to give a rating of whether they solved
the problem via Insight, Noninsight, or Other. The order of ratings were counterbalanced
so for half of the participants a rating of 1 was Insight and a rating of 3 was Noninsight
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and, for the other half, a rating of 1 was Noninsight and a rating of 3 was Insight. After a
rating was given or time ran out the next problem was presented. Thirty problems were
presented and then the participant was asked to stop and notify the experimenter. The
experimenter then gave the participant the appropriate instructions for the second task;
after which, the participant continued to solve the next 30 problems while thinking aloud
or keeping silent. Upon completion of the CRA task, participants were debriefed.

Results
In all subsequent analyses variables were checked for normal distributions.
Although some variables revealed slight skew, no corrections improved the skew. All
repeated measure analyses where checked for assumption violations. No analyses were
subject to any violations except sphericity. However, in each analysis only two variables
were compared so corrections could not be made. Subsequent paired T-tests reveal the
same pattern of results so the repeated-measure analyses are valid assessments.

Solution Rates and Times
Solution rates were calculated in each Task condition in two ways. The first
metric was a percentage of problems solved with Insight, Noninsight, or Other (e.g.,
Insight percentage = # of Insight solutions / # of problems attempted). The second metric
was a proportion of Insight ratings participants gave (e.g., Insight proportion = # of
Insight solutions / # of Insight + # of Noninsight), excluding problems solved with other.
Response times were obtained for each solved problem and used to calculate the average
time to solution for each Problem Type and each Task. Time began when the problem
first appeared and ended when the final solution was entered.
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Overall, participants solved an average of 51.88% (SD = 11.57%) of problems.
For solved problems, participants reported solution by Insight 56.25% (SD = 18.63%) of
the time, Noninsight 31.57% (SD = 19.66%) of the time, and Other 12.17% (SD =
12.61%) of the time. Average time to solution (response time) was 10.48 seconds (SD =
16.33). There were no effects of counterbalancing the orders of ratings or verbalization
task conditions within subjects, so data were collapsed across levels of counterbalancing.
A 2 (Task) X 3 (Problem Type) within-subjects repeated measures analysis was
performed to analyze the effects of Task and Problem Type (Insight, Noninsight, Other).
Solution rates for each contrast were based on the percentage of attempted problems that
were solved with each Problem Type per Task. More problems were solved in the
nonverbalization condition than in the verbalization condition, F(1,30) = 7.096, p = .012.
Solution rates also differed for different Problem-Types, F(2,60) = 34.699, p < .001. The
Task by Problem Type interaction was not significant, F(2,60) =.806, p = .452. Pairwise
comparisons revealed that more problems were solved with Insight (M = .294, SE = .021)
than Noninsight (M =.163, SE = .019), t(30) = 3.972, p < .001, and Noninsight than Other
(M = .061, SE = .011), t(30) = 4.041, p < .001. Participants tend to solve more problems
with Insight than Noninsight and solve more when not verbalizing than when verbalizing
(see Figure 1). Using the second metric described above, a paired t-test revealed that, of
the solved problems (Insight + Noninsight), participants did not solve a different
proportion with insight in the Verbalization condition (M = 66.78%, SD = 23.37)
compared to the No Verbalization condition (M = 62.92%, SD = 21.38), t(30) = 1.051, p
= .301.
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Figure 1. Solution rates of attempted problems in Experiment 1. Mean proportion of
attempted problems solved with Insight, Noninsight, or Other while verbalizing and
while not verbalizing. Error bars indicate one standard error.

Response times. For the following analyses only two levels of Problem Type were
used (Insight and Noninsight) because many people did not report “Other” for any solved
problems which resulted in missing data for the level. “Other” problems were removed
from the analysis and then five subjects were dropped from the analysis because they
reported solving problems solely with Insight within at least one level of Task.
A 2 (Task) X 2 (Problem Type) within-subjects repeated measure analysis was
performed for solution times. Response times were longer for Noninsight problems (M =
13.004 seconds, SE = .810) than Insight problems (M = 9.721 seconds, SE = .639),
F(1,25) = 6.866, p =.015, and longer for Verbalization (M = 12.205 seconds, SE = .480)
than No Verbalization (M = 10.519 seconds, SE = .472), F(1, 25) = 8.115, p = .009 (see
Figure 2). The interaction between Task and Problem Type was not significant, F(1,25) =
.110, p = .743.
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Figure 2. Mean solution times for Insight and Noninsight solutions per verbalization
condition in Experiment 1. Error bars indicate one standard error.

Though it takes people longer to solve problems while thinking aloud, people will
not likely solve any more problems if given more time. Thinking aloud while attempting
to solve CRA problems inhibits solution regardless of the solution method used (Insight,
Noninsight, or Other). Verbalizing does not affect the proportion of ratings people give
(i.e., insight proportion). The effect is that verbalization has a negative effect on solution
of CRA problems but protocols can be used to study insight problem solving without
affecting the likelihood of solving with the subjective experience of insight. The verbal
overshadowing effect is present and will be discussed more below.

Verbal Protocol Analysis
The verbal protocols, obtained in the verbalization task, were coded for
occurrences of impasses, restructuring elements, and fixation. Fixation was calculated as
the average number of new candidate solutions generated for each problem. Impasse was
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calculated as the average number of impasses per problem and coded on five different
levels (Regenerating, Rereading, No New, Frustration, and Discontinuing) as discussed
below. Restructuring was calculated as the average number of times restructuring
occurred per problem and coded on three different levels (Elaboration, Re-encoding, and
Constraint Relaxation) as discussed below. Details of each coding scheme are discussed
below with each respective analysis (coding instructions can be found in Appendix C).
Three analyses for each coded variable were performed with only two levels of
Problem-Type (Insight and Noninsight) for the same reasons as in the previous analysis
and one level of Task (Verbalization condition). Four subjects were dropped from the
first analysis (n = 27) because they solved problems with only insight or other. Because
the amount of time a person spends on a problem affects the amount of fixation, impasse,
and restructuring that can possibly be obtained, each score for each problem was first
divided by the amount of time it took to solve the problem before averaging responses.
A second analysis of the coding of variables was performed because many of the
solutions reported as Insight were simply the first solution that a person considered. A
person may report the quickly solved problems as insight simply because they came to a
solution so quickly that it seemed surprising and insightful. However, the process might
not have involved insight as I have defined it. Two distinct types of Insight solutions
were differentiated: “immediate,” as just described, and “delayed,” problems solved after
at least some deliberation. Immediate-insight solutions were solved with insight, within
15 seconds, when the solution was the first candidate considered and there were no signs
of impasse or restructuring in the verbal protocols. Delayed-insight problems were solved
with insight when the solution was not the first candidate considered, and/or more than
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15 seconds elapsed between presentation and solution of the problem, and/or there were
clear signs of impasse or restructuring, or both, in the verbal protocols. Fixation, impasse,
and restructuring variables were reexamined for each type of insight: Immediate-insight
and Delayed-insight. The results of splitting insight into two categories reveal large
differences between the effects seen in the combined-insight versus noninsight analysis
and the effects seen in the delayed-insight versus noninsight analysis. In summary, I
examined four problem types (Combined-Insight, Immediate-insight, Delayed-insight,
and Noninsight) in three comparisons (Combined-Insight vs. Noninsight, Immediateinsight vs. Noninsight, and Delayed-insight vs. Noninsight). The large difference in
effects for the Combined-Insight analysis and the Delayed-insight analysis is because the
Combined-Insight analysis included mostly Immediate-insight solutions, thereby
significantly reducing the means of fixation, impasse, and restructuring in the CombinedInsight analysis compared to the means in the Delayed-insight analysis. Participants
solved, on average, 6.04 (SD = 3.72) problems with Immediate-insight and 2.29 (SD =
1.65) problems with Delayed-insight. Three additional subjects were dropped from the
second analysis (n = 24) because they did not report any Delayed-insight solutions.
In a re-analysis (third analysis, n = 24), I re-examined the Combined-Insight vs.
Noninsight comparisons for each variable (fixation, impasse, and restructuring) excluding
the three subjects that were removed in the second analysis. The third analysis served as a
check that the three extra subjects removed did not have a large effect on the first
analysis. Results indicate that removing the three extra subjects does not significantly
affect the analysis. A comparison of the first analyses and the third analyses can be found
in Table 3 at the end of the behavioral results section.
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Fixation. Fixation was coded as the number of new candidate answers generated
per problem. A person had high fixation if they generated very few new candidates.
Generating more new candidates represents lower fixation. The idea is that producing
more solution candidates means a person is utilizing a broader semantic network and is
less fixated on specific objects in the problem; or that less time is spent fixating on the
objects that have already been rejected as incorrect. Coding of fixation was a
straightforward count and no differences were found between two independent coders.
Three within-subjects repeated measure analyses were performed on fixation
scores per Problem Type. In the first analysis, there was no difference in the amount of
fixation for Combined-Insight (M = .155/second, SD = .054) and Noninsight (M =
.153/second, SD = .043) solutions, F(1,26) = .031, p = .862 (see Figure 3a). In the second
analysis, again there was no difference in the amount of fixation between Delayed-insight
(M = .163/second, SD = .078) and Noninsight (M = .152/second, SD = .045) solutions,
F(1,23) = .491, p = .490, or between Immediate-insight (M = .153/second, SD = .05) and
Noninsight solutions, F(1,23) = .012, p = .915 (see Figure 3b). Participants generated
nearly the same rate of new candidates whether the problem is ultimately solved with
insight or noninsight, regardless of whether insight was delayed or immediate.
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Figure 3. Mean number of new candidates generated per second in Experiment 1: a
comparison of Fixation Analyses 1 and 2. The first analysis (a) shows the Combined
Insight vs. Noninsight analysis (n = 27). The second analysis (b) shows Immediateinsight and Delayed-insight solutions compared to Noninsight solutions (n = 24). Error
bars indicate one standard error.
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Impasse. Five types of Impasse were coded (Regenerating, Rereading,
Discontinuing, No-New, and Frustration). Regenerating meant that a person generated
the same solution candidate 2 or more times within a problem. Rereading meant that a
person reread the problem words 3 or more times in succession without generating a
solution candidate. Discontinuing meant that the person completely stopped solving the
problem (i.e., started talking about something else, unrelated to the task and in which no
progress toward solution was being made). No-New meant that a person stopped
generating new solution words for at least 15 seconds after onset of a problem or at least
10 seconds between candidates. Finally, Frustration meant that a person exhibited clear
signs of emotional frustration (i.e., something demonstrating that they can’t find a
solution, are experiencing real difficulty with the task or specific problem, or sigh out of
frustration and not just tiredness or boredom). The individual scores were summed to get
a total impasse score.
Two independent raters coded the data, and agreement between raters on the
number of total impasses per problem was good (Pearson r = .84, Kendall’s tau = .77).
Individual within-subjects repeated measures analyses performed on each coding level of
impasse revealed no significant differences between insight and noninsight problems.
The effect was the same for the delayed-insight vs. noninsight analysis. Immediateinsight did show significantly less impasse than noninsight for levels of no-new and
frustration (see Table 1 for all three comparisons).
Three within-subjects repeated measure analyses were performed on total impasse
scores per Problem Type. In the first analysis, the amount of total impasse was greater for
Noninsight (M = .022/second, SD = .028) than Combined-Insight (M = .010/second, SD =
34

.016) problems, F(1,26) = 4.348, p = .047, when immediate and delayed-insight problems
are combined in the analysis (see Figure 4a). In the second analysis, there is also
significantly less impasse for Immediate-insight solutions (M = 0, SD = 0) than
Noninsight solutions (M = .022/second, SD = .029), F(1,23) = 21.73, p < .001. The
opposite effect is seen when comparing Delayed-insight and Noninsight solutions. The
amount of total impasse for Delayed-insight solutions (M = .037/second, SD = .040) is
greater than that of Noninsight solutions (M = .022/second, SD = .029), F(1,23) = 4.789,
p = .039 (see Figure 4b). When immediate and delayed-insight problems are combined in
the analysis there is a higher rate of impasse for Noninsight solutions due to the effect of
Immediate-insight solutions, but when only Delayed-insight solutions are included there
is a higher rate of impasse for insight solutions (see Table 1).

Table 1
Within-subjects Repeated Measures Analysis for Each Level of Impasse in Experiment 1
(n = 24)
Means
Analysis
Rereading
Regenerating
Discontinuing
No New
Frustration

Combined
Insight

Immediateinsight

Delayedinsight

Noninsight

0.0026 (0.0083)
0.0007 (0.0033)
0.0006 (0.0020)
0.0036 (0.0086)
0.0033 (0.0061)

0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)
0 (0)**
0 (0)**

0.0045 (0.0110)
0.0027 (0.0123)
0.0044 (0.0180)
0.0087 (0.0167)
0.0170 (0.0331)

0.0022 (0.0062)
0 (0)
0.0066 (0.0195)
0.0053 (0.0081)
0.0077 (0.0157)

Total Impasse 0.0107 (0.0165)*
0 (0)***
0.0373 (0.0395)** 0.0219 (0.0294)
Notes. Values represent mean number of occurrences per second. Standard Deviations are
in parentheses. Noninsight means remained the same for both analyses and is only
reported once. Significant effects are represented by stars (*) in the “Insight” columns.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .001
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a)
Insight

0.03

Impasse Score

(Number of Impasse/Second)

Noninsight
0.025
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0

Verbalization Condition Only

b)
Immediate-insight

0.05

Delayed-insight

(Number of Impasse/Second)

Impasse Score

0.045

Noninsight

0.04
0.035
0.03
0.025
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0.015
0.01
0.005
0

Verbalization Condition Only

Figure 4. Mean rate of impasse for insight and noninsight solutions in Experiment 1: a
comparison of Total Impasse Analyses 1 and 2. The first analysis (a) shows the
Combined Insight vs. Noninsight analysis (n = 27). The second analysis (b) shows
Immediate-insight and Delayed-insight solutions compared to Noninsight solutions (n =
24). The Immediate-insight bar does not show because it is zero, but it is significantly
below Noninsight and Delayed-insight. Error bars indicate one standard error.
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Restructuring. Restructuring was coded on three different levels (Elaboration, Reencoding, and Constraint Relaxation). Elaboration meant that a person switched to a
different meaning of a problem word after trying and failing to find a solution with the
first meaning of a word (i.e., “star” has multiple meanings: starlight, an object in the sky,
or superstar, a person). Re-encoding meant that a person switched to a different problem
word to try and find a solution after failing with a previous word. Finally, Constraint
Relaxation meant that a person revised the idea of the goal by switching the method for
solving the problem or clearly stating that they needed to try something different to get a
solution. Individual scores were summed to obtain a total restructuring score. Two
independent raters coded the data, and agreement between raters on the number of total
restructurings per problem was good (Pearson r = .77, Kendall’s tau = .71). Individual
repeated measures analyses performed on each coding level of restructuring revealed no
significant effect between Insight and Noninsight solutions. Delayed-insight solutions
showed significantly more re-encoding than noninsight solutions. Immediate-insight
solutions showed significantly less re-encoding and marginally less elaboration (see
Table 2 for all three comparisons).
Three within-subjects repeated measure analyses were performed on total
restructuring scores per Problem Type. In the first analysis, the amount of total
restructuring was greater for Noninsight solutions (M = .037/second, SD = .0335) than
Combined-Insight solutions (M = .019/second, SD = .0203), F(1,26) = 5.59, p = .026 (see
Figure 5a). In the second analysis, there is significantly less restructuring for Immediateinsight solutions (M = 0, SD = 0) than Noninsight solutions (M = .037/sec, SD = .035),
F(1,23) = 26.36, p < .0001. Again, the opposite effect is seen when comparing Delayed37

insight and Noninsight solutions. The amount of total restructuring is greater for
Delayed-insight solutions (M = .065/sec, SD = .048) than Noninsight solutions (M =
.037/second, SD = .035), F(1,23) = 7.329, p = .013 (see Figure 5b). When immediate and
delayed-insight problems are combined in the analysis there is a higher rate of
restructuring for Noninsight solutions due to the effect of Immediate-insight solutions,
but when only Delayed-insight solutions are included there is a higher rate of
restructuring for insight solutions (see Table 2).

Table 2
Within-subjects Repeated Measures Analysis for Each Level of Restructuring in
Experiment 1 (n = 24)
Means
Analysis

Combined
Insight

Immediateinsight

Delayedinsight

Noninsight

Re-encoding
0.0165 (0.0193)
0 (0)**
0.0508 (0.0442)** 0.0296 (0.0328)
Elaboration
0.0037 (0.0092)
0 (0)*
0.0118 (0.0316) 0.0058 (0.0139)
CR
0.0007 (0.0028)
0 (0)
0.0025 (0.0089) 0.0015 (0.0054)
Total
Restructuring 0.0210 (0.0203)*
0 (0)***
0.0652 (0.0477)** 0.0368 (0.0352)
Notes. Values represent mean number of occurrences per second. Standard Deviations are
in parentheses. Noninsight means remained the same for both analyses and is only
reported once. Significant effects are represented by stars (*) in the “Insight” columns.
CR = Constraint Relaxation.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .0001
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b)
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Figure 5. Mean rate of restructuring for Insight and Noninsight solutions in Experiment
1: a comparison of Total Restructuring Analyses 1 and 2. The first analysis (a) shows the
Combined Insight vs. Noninsight analysis (n = 27). The second analysis (b) shows
Immediate-insight and Delayed-insight solutions compared to search solutions (n = 24).
The Immediate-insight bar does not show because it is zero, but it is significantly below
Noninsight and Delayed-insight. Error bars indicate one standard error.
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Impasse preceding restructuring. A final variable was coded as the average
number of times a person restructured the problem immediately after they reached an
impasse (I-R). Restructuring had to be the first action after reaching an impasse. In the
first analysis, there was no difference in the occurrences of impasse directly preceding
restructuring between Combined-Insight solutions (M = .022, SD = .062) and Noninsight
solutions (M = .071, SD = .21), F(1,26) = 1.293, p = .266 (see Figure 6a). In the second
analysis, Immediate-insight solutions are only marginally less than Noninsight solutions
(M = .077, SD = .22), F(1,23) = 2.929, p = .10. There is no significant difference in the
occurrences of impasse directly preceding restructuring between Delayed-insight
solutions (M = .005/second, SD = .0139) and Noninsight solutions (M = .077, SD = .22),
F(1,23) = .037, p = .848 (see Figure 6b). Participants proceeded to restructure
immediately after an impasse just as much regardless of whether the problem is
ultimately solved with Insight (immediate or delayed) or Noninsight. Participants reach
more impasses and restructure more when problems are solved with Insight than
Noninsight, but an impasse is no more likely to immediately precede restructuring for
Noninsight problems. Actually very seldom did an impasse ever precede restructuring.
The effect could be due to unconscious, unobservable components not seen in the verbal
protocols. The results show a large difference between the Immediate-insight and
Delayed-insight problems.
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Figure 6. Mean number of impasses preceding restructuring per second for Insight and
Noninsight solutions in Experiment 1: a comparison of I-R Analyses 1 and 2. The first
analysis (a) shows the Combined Insight vs. Noninsight analysis (n = 27). The second
analysis (b) shows Immediate-insight and Delayed-insight solutions compared to
Noninsight solutions (n = 24). The Immediate-insight bar does not show because it is
zero, but it is marginally less than Noninsight and Delayed-insight. Error bars indicate
one standard error.
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Table 3
Comparison of Means for Protocol Analyses 1 a and 3 b in Experiment 1
Analysis 1: Original Analysis (n = 27)
Analysis
Insight
Noninsight
Fixation

0.1550 (0.0544)

Analysis 3: Re-analysis (n = 24)
Insight
Noninsight

0.1527 (0.0431)

0.1501 (0.0131)

0.1520 (0.0447)

Impasse

0.0095 (0.0159)** 0.0215 (0.0280)

0.0107 (0.0165)*

0.0219 (0.0294)

Restr

0.0187 (0.0203)** 0.0375 (0.0335)

0.0210 (0.0203)*

0.0368 (0.0352)

I-R
0.0224 (0.0623) 0.0710 (0.2086)
0.0252 (0.0657) 0.0771 (0.2207)
Notes. Values represent mean number of occurrences per second. Standard deviations are
in parentheses. I-R = Impasse preceding restructuring. Restr = Restructuring.
a
1 = First Analysis (n = 27). b3 = Re-analysis (n = 24).
*p < .10. ** p < .05.

Discussion
The purpose of Experiment 1 was to determine if CRA problems can reliably used
as insight-like problems. If CRA problems are insight problems, then there should be
higher fixation scores, restructuring scores, and impasse scores for insight solutions
compared to noninsight solutions. There should also be some verbal overshadowing
effect like that seen in prior studies of insight problem solving.
The results indicate at least some verbal overshadowing effect when solving CRA
problems while thinking aloud. Verbalization hindered solution rates and response times.
Because different CRA problems are structurally the same and each one can be solved
with or without insight, both insight and noninsight problems suffer from the effects of
verbal overshadowing. Short-term memory, working memory, and long-term memory
retrieval are impacted by concurrent verbalization of processes that are not normally
verbalized (Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Schooler et al., 1993). Even the methodological
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approach to solving a problem without insight requires retrieval from long-term memory.
Unlike prior studies (e.g., Ericsson & Simon, 1980; Schooler et al., 1993) that show
verbalization does not inhibit incremental noninsight problems, the strategies people use
to solve noninsight CRA problems are not usually reported or logically referenced like
people can with noninsight problems (e.g., an algebra problem). Verbalizing may hinder
people from keeping track of where they are and where they are going (in working
memory) as well as accessing seemingly distant concepts (in long-term memory). Both
insight and noninsight CRA problem solving is affected by concurrent verbalizations.
Overall, verbalization seemed to affect insight problem solving as predicted.
The analysis of verbal protocols provided a few unique findings. Although there
was no difference in the number of new candidates generated for insight problems and
noninsight problems, I believe this is understandable. One reason is that the test for
fixation was indirect. Rather than coding for fixation on objects, fixation was coded as
the number of new candidates generated. Because of the time limit, and the fact that
people can only produce a certain number of candidates within that time, there may have
been some ceiling effect such that candidates can only be generated as fast as someone
can generate and test the potential solution before having to try something new. Also,
producing more new candidates might not affect how a person solves a given CRA
problem but how the candidates are accessed may be important. For example, a person
may generate the same number of new candidates in the same amount of time for two
CRA problems. However, one is solved with insight and the other without insight. The
difference may be that the candidates of the insight problem were produced through
restructuring of the problem whereas the noninsight problem did not require restructuring
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but just a generate-and-test methodological approach. The noninsight problem elicited as
many new candidates but utilized a different methodology requiring less restructuring
than the insight problem.
The results of impasse and restructuring scores first indicated an opposite effect
than expected. At first glance, the results can be taken that the coding scheme was
ineffective or that CRA problems are not actually insight problems. However, closer
inspection of insight solutions revealed that many problems solved with insight were
simply the first word that came to mind. The processes used here might not actually be
that of insight. People may report insight simply because the answer was sudden. Or,
there may have been insight, but that it occurred so quickly that participants were not able
to verbalize much before solution. Using people’s subjective “Aha!” experience as a
marker of insight might not be a reliable indicator of insight by itself.
Further analyses revealed a significant difference in the methods used to solve the
problems. The problems solved immediately with insight had no observable
characteristics of insight (fixation, impasse, and restructuring), while the delayed-insight
solutions had much more of the characteristics of insight. When analyzed together insight
solutions are solved faster and have significantly less rates of impasse and restructuring
than noninsight solutions, but when immediate-insight solutions are removed from the
analysis the results flip. Delayed-insight problems are solved in about the same time as
noninsight solutions and have significantly higher rates of impasse and restructuring than
noninsight solutions, which should be the case. In comparison, delayed-insight solutions
are very much different than immediate-insight solutions, revealing much higher rates of
impasse, and restructuring. From a representational perspective, immediate-insight
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solutions required no representational change because the initial representation acquired
lead to the correct solution. There may be two different methods for obtaining insight for
CRA problems. Paraphrasing Newell (1973), people may perform a task using different
methods and psychologists should take this into account when analyzing data. The effect
of averaging over methods “conceals, rather than reveals” (p. 295) any true effect.
Earlier I noted Schooler et al. (1995) saying that there may be different processes
which still lead to insight. From the results of Experiment 1, there is some concern that
some prior results may have been clouded by averaging the data of the two distinct types
of insight (immediate and delayed). Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) found more activity in the
RH-aSTG, possibly indicating the sudden emergence of the correct solution, that may be
facilitated by cognitive control activity prior to problem onset in the dACC (Kounios et
al., 2006; Subramaniam et al., 2009). However, the results likely include immediateinsight problems in the data. Are these insight areas the only areas necessary for insight?
Are they even insight areas to begin with? There might be different, or additional, areas
that are necessary for insight, which are not revealed in prior studies. The areas noted
here might actually be specific only to immediate-insight and not delayed-insight. The
conclusion drawn is that separating the two types of insight problems during analysis
may reveal different results than prior studies. By pulling apart the two types of insight
problems the processes of insight can be further explored. After all, the delayed type
insight problems seem to resemble real world insight more than the immediate type and
fit better to the definition of insight presented in this thesis. In conclusion, CRA problems
can, and should, be used to study insight. However, researchers should differentiate
immediate and delayed insight solutions.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 2 – NEUROIMAGING STUDY

The neuroimaging hypothesis stems from the results of the analysis of verbal
protocols in Experiment 1 and questions that arose from prior research. Specifically,
insight CRA problems should be broken down into separate categories (immediate and
delayed). The results of this study will analyze immediate-insight, delayed-insight, and
search solutions. This differs from prior fMRI research examining insight in that this
study makes the distinction between immediate-insight and delayed-insight problems.
I employed neuroimaging (fMRI) techniques to find the areas in the brain more
readily activated for insight problem solving than for noninsight problem solving using
the same CRA problems as in the behavioral design. I expected that, similar to JungBeeman et al. (2004) and Subramaniam et al. (2009), insight activity would differ from
noninsight activity at solution. I also expected to find differences between immediate and
delayed type insight solutions. The purpose of the neuroimaging study is to replicate and
extend prior studies of insight using CRA problems. By teasing apart the two types of
insight (immediate and delayed), a further understanding of the network of brain areas
activated for insight should be revealed. Delayed-insight problems should reveal cortical
areas needed for insight that were clouded by averaging data across both immediate and
delayed-insight solutions in prior studies, particularly the components necessary for
restructuring and the “Aha!” moment.
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After some discussion, it was decided that using the labels “insight” and
“noninsight” may be compromising participants’ understanding and ability to distinguish
between the two methods for solving a CRA problem. Therefore, in the fMRI
experiment, the label “noninsight” was switched with the label “search” in order to make
a clear distinction between obtaining a solution via insight and obtaining a solution via
analytical, or methodological, search strategy.

Method

Participants
Participants were 18 undergraduates recruited from Mississippi State University
(M age = 20, SD = 2.05, range = 18–26). All participants were right handed, native
English speakers, with normal or corrected to normal vision. Participants were selected if
they met standard safety screening requirements for magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
studies. Participants received compensation at a rate of $20 per hour of participation.
Two participants were excluded from analysis due to an error capturing solution
responses for one participant and due to the other participant providing zero insight
responses.

Design
The design was a single factor, within-subject, study examining two levels of
Problem Type (between Insight, Immediate-insight, or Delayed-insight and Search). No
concurrent verbalization was required for the neuroimaging experiment. However,
participants were required to verbalize solutions rather than type them in. Imaging was
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carried out in an event-related design to assess differences in activation for problems
reported as involving Insight, Immediate-insight, or Delayed-insight versus Search. The
event related design was possible because individual CRA problems can be solved via
Insight or Search depending on the solver.

Materials
Eighty CRA problems were used in the neuroimaging experiment (problems used
can be found in Appendix A). Instead of a computer monitor, CRA problems were
projected onto a screen located behind the bore of the MRI. The experimental design was
implemented using the fMRI package within the E-prime software suite (Schneider et al.,
2002) to enhance stimulus time-locking and response collection. A mirror on the head
coil, angled toward the participant’s field of view, was used to allow participants to see
the screen. A microphone that filters out the noise from the MRI was used to acquire
verbal solution responses.

Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The procedure of the neuroimaging
experiment was similar to the behavioral experiment except for some variations to
account for fMRI data acquisition and analysis constraints. Upon meeting selection
criteria and obtaining informed consent, participants underwent training in a mock MRI
machine. The mock MRI machine is a replica of the actual machine but without an actual
magnet. The same sounds heard during an actual scan were played during training.
During training exercises, participants were given feedback if they moved their head too
much. The purpose of training was to get participants familiar with the setting for the
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experiment, have them learn to keep their head still during imaging, as well as to
familiarize them with the task objectives. If participants met performance criteria (i.e.,
had better than average solution percentage and revealed sufficient understanding
between search and insight problem types) they were invited to the second MRI session.
The MRI session consisted of 30 minutes of practice and a 90 minute imaging session.
The two sessions (training and imaging) were completed within a one week span.
Participants were given the same descriptions for insight and search problem types as in
the behavioral experiment. Additional instructions were given for deciding whether an
answer was the first thing that came to their mind (our immediate type problems) or if the
solution came after thinking of other things first (our delayed type problems).
For the MRI session, participants were re-familiarized with the task instructions,
given practice on the puzzle problems, and gave informed consent before entering the
MRI room. Prior to imaging, participants laid on the scanner table, were assessed for
comfort, and a head coil (with foam restraints to keep the head from moving) was placed
over the head. Participants were given button pads to record responses. An active noise
canceling microphone system (Psychology Software Tools, Inc., Pittsburgh, PA) was
attached to the head coil and used to collect verbalized solution responses. Structural
images were acquired first and then participants completed a visual, auditory, and motor
tracker task used to localize brain areas responsible for seeing, hearing, and motor
movement. This task was used as a quality check to ensure adequate functional signal-tonoise ratio for each subject and will not be discussed further. Participants completed 5-7
runs of CRA problem solving. For each run, participants solved as many problems as
they could in seven minutes. The last run was of varying length depending on the number
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of problems left to be solved. For every two runs of CRA problem solving, participants
completed a lexical decision filler task resulting in a total of 7-10 runs. The lexical
decision runs were part of another study, and will not be discussed further. Participants
were prompted to press a button when they were ready to begin a run. Figure 7a
represents the structure of runs throughout the entire session.
Figure 7b represents the task procedure for each individual CRA problem. For
each CRA problem, a fixation cross was first presented in the center of the screen for a
jitter interval of two, four, or six seconds (preparation interval). The three problem words
were then presented simultaneously in horizontal orientation above, at, and below the
fixation cross. The time limit to solution was 30 seconds. Participants were instructed to
press any button on the response pads as quickly as they could as soon as they thought
they had the correct solution. If no solution was reached the next problem was presented.
Upon solution, after a second jitter interval of two, four, or six seconds, participants were
prompted to say their solution aloud for which they verbalized their answer and pressed a
button to continue to the next screen. Participants were then asked for a problem rating
for whether the solution was obtained via insight, search (noninsight in Experiment 1), or
by some other means. After the response, participants were asked if the solution was the
first word they thought of or if they thought of other words before the final solution. A
“yes” (right index finger) meant that the solution was the first word and a “no” (left index
finger) meant that the solution was preceded by other candidate solutions. After pressing
the “yes” or “no” button the next problem began, starting with the preparation interval.
The task steps, from fixation cross to the last rating question, repeated for each CRA
problem. Participants completed as many runs as necessary to complete all 80 problems
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(or as many as they could in the 90 minute session). Upon completion of the CRA task,
participants were escorted from the MRI room, debriefed, and paid for their participation.

a) Session Procedure

b) Puzzle Run Procedure

Figure 7. Neuroimaging procedure in Experiment 2. (a) Procedure for entire session.
Participants completed 2 runs of CRA problem solving between each lexical decision
run. The duration of the last puzzle run varies in length depending on the number of
problems that are left. (b) Procedure for individual CRA problems. VAM = Visual,
Auditory, and Motor.
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Image Acquisition and Analysis
Image acquisition and analysis was similar to Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and
Subramaniam et al. (2009). Imaging was performed on a 3-T GE scanner with an 8channel volume head coil during a 1.5 hour scanning session. Head motion was restricted
with foam padding. Structural images were acquired first, including scanner-specific
localizers and a volume anatomical series. Anatomical, high-resolution 3-D T1-weighted
axial images (1 sphere mm3) were acquired using a fast spoiled gradient-recalled
(FSPGR) pulse sequence. Functional images were acquired in an axial orientation using a
T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (EPI) pulse sequences sensitive to BOLD
signal (28 slices, 4 mm thick; 3.75-mm x 3.75-mm in-plane resolution; TR = 2000 ms;
TE = 30 ms; Flip Angle = 79; FOV = 24). Each functional run was preceded by an 8-s
saturation period during which no data were collected.
The raw neuroimaging data were preprocessed and analyzed using the AFNI
software package (Cox, 1996). Images were corrected for slice scan time because
interleaved, echo-planar imaging (EPI) was used. Three-dimensional motion correction
was performed during preprocessing. All functional images were realigned to the first
image for each run, which were aligned to the first run of each participant. Anatomical
images were co-registered, through time, to the functional images and functional EPI
volumes were spatially smoothed using a 7-mm full-width half-maximum (FWHM)
Gaussian kernel. Functional data were transformed to a standard Talairach space
(Talairach & Tournoux 1988) with a voxel size of 1 mm3.
Data were analyzed using general linear model analysis that extracted average
responses to each problem type, correcting for linear drift and excluding signal changes
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correlated with excessive head motion. The entire solution process as outlined in Figure 7
was modeled to remove signal associated with events other than the solution event. The
solution event began two seconds prior to the button press indicating a solution was
found. Utilizing a deconvolution method (9 regressors, 16 seconds per solution event),
the hemodynamic response shape was estimated and not assumed. Each problem-type
was examined for the solution response: Insight, Search, Delayed-insight, and
Immediate-insight. For each participant, the best-fitting model for consistent signal
change was obtained through general least squares correlations by estimating the
maximal likelihood that the hemodynamic response functions change in the same
manner. For each subject, a time-course of activation was extracted for each problem
type by finding consistent signal change across voxels in the 2nd through the 7th
regressors (2 – 12 seconds after the solution event). Individual subjects were analyzed, fit
to Talairach space, and then combined in a second-stage group analysis. A 3-way mixeddesign ANOVA was performed for each of three separate comparisons: Insight vs.
Search (I-S), Delayed-Insight vs. Search (DI-S), and Immediate-Insight vs. Search (II-S).
Time served as the first fixed factor and includes six levels in each analysis (one for each
beta in the model). Condition (problem type) served as the second fixed factor and
included two levels in each analysis (i.e., Insight or Search), Subjects served as a random
factor. Sixteen subjects were included in the I-S and II-S analysis and 14 subjects were
included in the DI-S analysis. The two subjects removed from the DI-S analysis solved
only one problem with Delayed-insight and could not be included in the analysis.
Removing these two subjects in the I-S and II-S analyses does not significantly affect the
results and therefore the full ranges of participants are used in these two analyses.
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Data analysis was performed using voxel-wise statistical techniques. Multiple
comparison correction was performed using family-wise error (FWE) cluster size
thresholding (Forman et al., 1995) to eliminate small clusters likely to be false-positives
yielding a FWE corrected p-value of .05 for all comparisons reported here. FWE cluster
thresholds were determined using AFNI’s Alphasim, which estimated minimum cluster
size (for uncorrected p < .01) at 562 1 mm3 voxels using Monte Carlo simulations. All
clusters showing differences in the ANOVA tests were significant when F > 3.274, p <
.01 (I-S and II-S analyses, n = 16) or F > 3.315, p < .01 (DI-S analysis, n = 14).

Results

Behavioral Results
Participants attempted an average of 78.38 (SD = 4.56) problems out of the 80
available for the fMRI session. Participants correctly solved 48.66% (SD = 8.41%) of the
attempted problems. For the correctly solved problems, 56.52% (SD = 15.62%) of their
solutions were solved with Insight (mean response time = 7.79 sec, SD = 2.08), 35.95%
(SD = 17.07%) were solved with Search (mean response time = 12.81 sec, SD = 2.85),
and 7.53% (SD = 6.50%) were solved by other means. Participants gave incorrect
responses to 7.88% (SD = 4.97%) of the solved problems, leaving 43.46% (SD = 11.18%)
of the problems unsolved.
Insight and Search responses were labeled as either “delayed” or “immediate”
solutions. Solutions were delayed (Delayed-insight = DI, Delayed-search = DS) if more
than 10 seconds elapsed before solution and/or the participant responded “no” to the
question asking if the first word they thought of was the solution. Solutions were labeled
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immediate (Immediate -insight = II, Immediate-search = IS) if the problem was solved in
under 10 seconds and the participant responded “yes” to the question asking if the first
word they thought of was the solution. Of all Insight solutions, 34.85% (SD = 20.99%)
were delayed and 65.15% (SD = 20.99%) were immediate. Of all the Search solutions,
82.97% (SD = 15.87%) were delayed and 17.03% (SD = 15.87%) were immediate. Table
4 displays the breakdown of delayed and immediate, insight and search solutions as
proportions of the correctly solved problems as well as mean response times for each
problem type.

Table 4
Mean RT’s and Proportions of Delayed and Immediate, Insight and Search Solutions in
Experiment 2 (n = 18)
Insight
Statistic
Proportion

Search

Delayed

Immediate

Delayed

Immediate

19.49% (12.31)

37.03% (14.88)

29.01% (13.38)

6.94% (7.44)

RT
12.53 sec (2.08) 5.19 sec (0.89)
14.24 sec (2.80) 6.10 sec (1.74)
Notes. Proportion is the mean percent of all correctly solved problems. Standard
deviations are in parentheses. RT = response time.

Imaging Results
The first analysis reported is the Combined-Insight vs. Search comparison as this
is most similar to prior research. The results of this comparison should match what has
been found in prior research (e.g., Jung-Beeman et al., 2004 and Subramaniam et al.,
2009). After this combined analysis, separate analyses for Immediate-insight and
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Delayed-insight solutions are reported. These analyses move beyond prior research by
examining the two types of insight solution methods found in Experiment 1.
Insight vs. Search. A 6 (Time) X 2 (Condition – Combined-Insight vs. Search) X
16 (Subjects) mixed-design ANOVA was performed to investigate the temporal
dynamics of activation when solving a problem with Insight versus Search over the first
12 seconds after the solution event. Axial slices of the brain showing significant areas of
activation for the Time X Condition interaction are displayed in Figure 8 below. Table 5
below shows the significant areas of activation for the main effect of Condition and the
Time X Condition interaction. A significant main effect of Condition was found in the
Superior/Medial Frontal Gyrus and Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus. These areas show a
greater activation for Search than Insight, mostly due to a larger decrease in activation
after peak for Insight than Search. The interaction of Condition and Time is the main
focus of the analysis as many areas show differential activation throughout the timecourse of the solution event. The interaction reveals significantly different patterns of
activation for Insight and Search solutions.
For each analysis performed, descriptions of the patterns of activation are based
on visual inspection of the waveforms. The general trend of activation differences over
time is that Insight is greater than Search in the first 2-6 seconds after the solution event,
after which Search shows greater signal as Insight signal decreases. This is consistent
with Jung-Beeman and colleagues in that peak signal in the RH-aSTG occurred at about 6
seconds after the solution event. Many regions found here are similar to regions found in
Subramaniam et al. (2009) and one area (cluster 4 in Table 5) is near the RH-aSTG found
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in Jung-Beeman et al. (2004). Figure 9 below displays a few of the representative
waveforms.

F = 10+

R

L

F=0

Figure 8. Areas showing a significant Time X Condition interaction effect in the I-S
analysis in Experiment 2.
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Table 5
Regions Showing Significant Activation in the I-S ANOVA Analysis in Experiment 2
Main Effect of Condition
BA
X
Y

Cluster Areas
1

MeFG
MeFG
Left Insula
Left IFG

2

Cluster Areas
1

ab

a
a

2
b

3
4b
5a
6
7
8a

32
8
13
44

-1
-2
-30
-47

8
25
23
18

Time X Condition Interaction
BA
X
Y

Precuneus
Paracentral Lobe
Cuneus
MCC
MCC
PCC
Right MOG
Right Thalamus
Right Lingual Gyrus
Right Lingual Gyrus
Right Fusiform Gyrus
Right pITG
Right pMTG
Right pMTG
Right pMTG
Right SmG
Right IPL
Right IPL
MCC
Right IFG
Right MFG
SFG
Left Fusiform Gyrus
Right IFG/aSTG/Insula
SFG
Right MFG
Right Fusiform Gyrus
Right Thalamus/PhG

7
5
18/19
31
23
23/29
18/31
17/18/19
18
18/19
19
39
21
37
40/13
40
40
32
9
6
6
18/19
47/38/13
6/8
8/9
19/37
27

0
5
3
2
-3
3
31
12
2
13
25
53
53
60
45
55
46
35
3
46
21
-3
-29
46
-3
34
29
17

-70
-44
-86
-27
-26
-39
-70
-26
-63
-76
-70
-57
-57
-45
-38
-45
-41
-49
15
8
18
-6
-64
13
32
30
-54
-30

Z

Peak F

Volume

46
42
5
10

44.30
24.80
29.50
27.52

4781

Z

Peak F

Volume

32
61
23
42
29
23
18
10
0
-13
-14
-14
8
-1
-4
24
43
43
38
32
55
70
-14
-3
54
36
-12
-3

12.65
12.33
10.77
11.2
9.73
9.51
7.48
6.16
7.26
7.05
7.84
7.17
6.86
5.76
6.24
7.66
6.79
5.76
10.65
7.67
7.64
6.07
8.43
7.55
6.46
5.74
5.95
4.95

60782

2082

9545

3549
1010
972
772
693
615

Notes. MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus. IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus. MCC = Middle
Cingulate Cortex. PCC = Posterior Cingulate Cortex. MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus.
pITG = posterior Inferior Temporal Gyrus. pMTG = posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus.
SmG = Supramarginal Gyrus. IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobe. MFG = Middle Frontal
Gyrus. aSTG = anterior Superior Temporal Gyrus. PhG = Parahippocampal Gyrus.
a
Regions similar to those found in Subramaniam et al.(2009).
b
Regions similar to those found in Jung-Beeman et al. (2004).
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Figure 9. Representative waveform patterns in the I-S analysis in Experiment 2. Values
in parentheses are Talairach coordinates. Time starts at the solution event. IPL = Inferior
Parietal Lobe. Error bars indicate one standard error.
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Overall there are greater signal differences in the RH, confirming the hypothesis
posed by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) and Fiore and Schooler (1998) that the RH is
advantageous to insight problem solving. Particular regions of interest include Frontal,
Parietal, posterior and middle Cingulate, and anterior and posterior temporal regions.
Contrary to expectations, no differences were found in the anterior Cingulate Cortex.
Middle and left frontal regions have greater activation for Search than Insight (or greater
decrease of activation for Insight) which is consistent with the hypothesis from Pobric et
al. (2008) that constraints are relaxed with decreased activation in the frontal cortex.
Activation is greater for Insight than Search in the right Inferior Frontal Gyrus/anterior
Superior Frontal Gyrus (Time X Condition interaction) and greater for Search than
Insight in the same area in the LH (main effect of condition). The pattern here supports
the hypothesis posed by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004) that words are sparsely coded in the
RH and finely coded in the LH. Because Experiment 1 showed that Immediate- and
Delayed- insight differ in terms of restructuring and impasses, separate analyses were
performed to examine differences between each type of Insight (delayed and immediate)
and Search.

Immediate-insight vs. Search. A 6 (Time) X 2 (Condition – Immediate-insight vs.
Search) X 16 (Subjects) mixed-design ANOVA was performed to investigate the
temporal dynamics of activation when solving a problem with Immediate-insight versus
Search over the first 12 seconds after the solution event. No main effect of Condition was
found in any areas of the brain. The interaction of Condition and Time is the main focus
of the analysis as many areas show differential activation throughout the time-course of
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the solution event. The interaction reveals significantly different patterns of activation for
Immediate-insight and Search solutions. Axial slices of the brain showing significant
areas of activation for the Time X Condition interaction are displayed in Figure 10 below.
Table 6 below shows the significant areas of activation for the Time X Condition
interaction. The pattern of activation closely resembles the findings of the I-S comparison
with a few exceptions. Representative waveforms are displayed in Figure 11 below.
Activation patterns for the II-S analysis are very similar to that found in the I-S
analysis. In the II-S analysis there seems to be a more robust signal in these same areas.
Many of the significant clusters are just larger and stretch across a larger area of the
brain. A few significant regions of activation, not seen in the I-S analysis, show a greater
peak signal for Search and Delayed-insight than Immediate-insight. These include the left
Superior and Middle Frontal Gyrus and the left Superior and Middle Temporal Gyrus.
Along the medial line, extending from the anterior/middle Cingulate Cortex through the
posterior Cingulate Cortex there is a greater signal for insight than search. Again, the
right Superior and Middle Temporal Gyrus, the right fusiform area, and the right Parietal
Lobe all show an increase in activation over Search, mostly early in the time-course (2-8
seconds). A small cluster in the left Amygdala, not seen in the I-S comparison, reveals a
greater signal for Immediate-insight than Search in the first 2-4 seconds after the solution
event, but shows equal activation later in the time-course. The pattern of activation in the
II-S analysis is somewhat similar to the pattern in I-S; however, DI-S shows a much
different pattern of activation.
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Figure 10. Areas showing a significant Time X Condition interaction effect in the II-S
analysis in Experiment 2.

62

Table 6
Regions Showing Significant Activation in the II-S ANOVA Analysis in Experiment 2

Cluster Areas
1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Time X Condition Interaction
BA
X
Y

MCC
MeFG
Right SFG
Right MFG
Right Precentral Gyrus
MCC
PCC
PCC
Right Thalamus
Left Thalamus
Paracentral Lobe
Precuneus
Precuneus
Precuneus
Cuneus
Lingual Gyrus
Right Fusiform Gyrus Left
Fusiform Gyrus Right
MTG
Right pMTG
Right pMTG
Right SmG
Right IPL
Right Cerebellum
Left Cerebellum
Left Culmen
Right MOG
Left aSTG
Left Insula/IFG
Right aSTG/Insula/IFG
Left Precentral Gyrus Left
MTG
Right MTG
Left MTG
Right IFG
Left Amygdala
Left MTG

32
9
9
6
6
23/24
23/29
29

5
7
7
7
19
18
18/19
18/19
21/22
21/22
39
40
40

37
18/31
22
13/47
22/13
6
39/37
46/10
9/10
9
22/21

3
2
19
28
45
2
2
6
7
-6
4
3
2
0
2
3
25
-30
54
60
57
53
45
53
-49
-36
31
-57
-44
50
-40
42
41
-32
46
-22
-51

15
47
43
4
-1
-20
-39
-41
-20
-23
-44
-53
-78
-70
-82
-74
-69
-64
-34
-47
-52
-49
-47
-61
-64
-53
-69
-5
13
9
-3
43
39
39
19
-4
-28

Z

Peak F

Volume

38
29
37
51
46
34
23
6
11
10
62
59
45
32
37
-3
-14
-13
-3
0
14
22
42
-24
-21
-20
18
8
2
-1
58
10
10
23
30
-6
0

18.02
6.7
10.33
7.76
7.87
15.54
10.64
11.81
13.63
8.74
13.35
13.19
11.29
15.27
10.41
8.76
11.27
13.88
9.42
8.58
8.26
11.72
9.66
8.98
6.09
10.64
6.38
8.91
7.30
11.64
6.55
8.31
6.76
5.25
5.52
5.99
9.4

142902

5743
4862
1909
1341
983
653
651
597
565

Notes. MCC = Middle Cingulate Cortex. MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus. SFG = Superior
Frontal Gyrus. MFG = Middle Frontal Gyrus. PCC = posterior Cingulate Cortex. MTG =
Middle Temporal Gyrus. pMTG = posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus. SmG =
Supramarginal Gyrus. IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobe. MOG = Middle Occipital Gyrus.
aSTG = anterior Superior Temporal Gyrus. IFG = Interior Frontal Gyrus.
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Figure 11. Representative waveform patterns in the II-S analysis. Delayed-insight
waveforms are included for comparison. Values in parentheses are Talairach coordinates.
Time starts at the solution event, two seconds prior to the button press indicating the
solver had an answer. SFG = Superior Frontal Gyrus. aSTG = anterior Superior Temporal
Gyrus. IFG = Inferior Frontal Gyrus. IPL = Inferior Parietal Lobe. MOG = Middle
Occipital Gyrus.
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Represented in Figure 11, Delayed-insight waveforms resemble the waveforms of
Search more than Immediate-insight waveforms. The regions involved when making
Immediate-insight responses show much different patterns of activation than when
making Delayed-insight responses. Interestingly, the right Superior Frontal Gyrus (SFG)
shows a much different pattern of activation between Search, Immediate-insight, and
Delayed-insight solutions possibly due to different patterns of retrieval operations
(discussed in detail below). Other regions, including the right SFG show this trend of
greater activation for Immediate-insight just prior to solutions. Delayed-insight solutions
unexpectedly show a much weaker signal in the right anterior Superior Temporal
Gyrus/Inferior Frontal Gyrus region. Although Delayed-insight and Search show very
similar waveforms, the DI-S analysis reveals a few areas that are different between
Delayed-insight and Search solutions.

Delayed-insight vs. Search. A 6 (Time) X 2 (Condition) X 14 (Subjects) mixeddesign ANOVA was performed to investigate the temporal dynamics of activation when
solving a problem with Delayed-insight versus Search over the first 12 seconds after the
solution event. A significant main effect of Condition was found in only one area of the
brain. The interaction of Condition and Time is the main focus of the analysis as more
areas show differential activation throughout the time-course of the solution event. The
interaction reveals significantly different patterns of activation for Delayed-insight and
Search solutions in only two clusters. Axial slices of the brain showing significant areas
of activation for the interaction effect are displayed in Figure 12 below. Table 7 below
shows the significant areas of activation for the main effect of Condition and the Time X
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Condition interaction. The pattern of activation greatly differs from the patterns of
activation seen in the I-S and II-S analyses. Waveforms from the interaction are displayed
in Figure 13 below.

F = 10+

R
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F=0

Figure 12. Areas showing a significant Time X Condition interaction effect in the DI-S
analysis in Experiment 2.
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Table 7
Regions Showing Significant Activation in the DI-S ANOVA Analysis in Experiment 2
Main Effect of Condition
BA
X
Y

Cluster Areas
1

Left Precuneus/Cuneus

Cluster Areas
1
2
3*
4*
5*
6*

Right SPL
Left pMTG
Left IPL
Left MeFG/ACC
Right Insula
Right MTG

31

-15

-64

Time X Condition Interaction
BA
X
Y
7
22/39
7
9
13
21

23
-44
-23
-10
33
65

-53
-57
-47
41
7
-21

Z

Peak F

Volume

18

26.52

571

Z

Peak F

Volume

49
13
47
21
1
-4

5.62
4.93
4.53
4.35
5.35
5.42

930
742
550
235
292
407

Notes. SPL = Superior Parietal Lobe. pMTG = posterior Middle Temporal Gyrus. IPL =
Inferior Parietal Lobe. MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus. ACC = anterior Cingulate Cortex.
*Areas are only marginally significant (p < 0.0174). Volume sizes are when p = 0.01.

The pattern of activation seen in the DI-S analysis is very different than that seen
in the previous analyses. Delayed-insight and Search are not very different from each
other as was Immediate-insight from Search. The significant cluster found in the main
effect of Condition, the left Precuneus, is close to the left Middle Temporal Gyrus (LMTG) found in the interaction analysis (although it is located closer to the medial line
near the Posterior Cingulate Cortex). Although there is greater activation for search than
delayed-insight in the left Precuneus, there is a slightly higher signal increase for Delayed
insight than Search in the L-MTG. The waveforms differ in pattern but are not very
different in terms of percent signal change (all waveforms can be seen in Figure 13).
Signal increases in the right Superior Parietal Lobe earlier for insight than Search
(although the signal for search peaks higher at about 6 seconds). Delayed-insight signal
waveforms reveal a different pattern in activation than either Immediate-insight or Search
(notice the double hump for Delayed-insight solutions) and may represent special
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patterns of changing representations unique to Delayed-insight solutions (and
restructuring). Two clusters of interest showed marginal significant activation
differences: the right Middle Temporal Gyrus (p = .0160) and the anterior Cingulate
Cortex (p = .0174). Visualization of these waveforms reveals a large decrease in
activation just prior to solution, followed by a larger peak signal for Delayed-insight than
Search at around the solution response.
Because the activation for delayed-insight is so similar to search, and there is
many more immediate-insight than delayed-insight problems in the combined insight
effect, the more robust signal seen in the II-S analysis (covering the same general clusters
seen in the I-S analyses) is likely due to the removal of delayed-insight problems. For
example, removing very different samples from a factor reduces variance and strengthens
the analysis. Most of the effect in the I-S analysis is likely due to the inclusion of a larger
proportion of immediate-insight problems than delayed-insight problems within the
insight condition. Immediate-insight is very different from search and delayed-insight is
very similar to search. This fact brings with it strong implications for theories of insight.
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Figure 13. Representative waveform patterns in the DI-S analysis. Values in parentheses
are Talairach coordinates. Time starts at the solution event, two seconds prior to the
button press indicating the solver had an answer. SPL = Superior Parietal Lobe. IPL =
Inferior Parietal Lobe. MTG = Middle Temporal Gyrus. MeFG = Medial Frontal Gyrus.
ACC = anterior Cingulate Cortex.
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Discussion
Insight, as traditionally studied, involves overcoming impasses and a restructuring
of the problem space in order to obtain a sudden and surprising solution. The initial path
to solution is often incorrect and the solver must abandon or modify that path in order to
achieve a solution. In Experiment 1, problems solved with immediate-insight showed no
signs of restructuring or impasse and the solution was always the first candidate retrieved
from memory. This implies that immediate-insight problems are not insight problems at
all. The initial solution path is correct and therefore no insight should occur. Rather, there
is a strong affect of immediacy that may resemble insight and contribute to an “Aha!”
experience. Participants are told to indicate a solution was solved with insight if it
suddenly pops into their head and could be the reason why they rate an immediate-insight
as solution as “insight” even if it truly is not. The delayed-insight problems resemble
insight as it has been traditionally studied. The initial representation is incorrect and the
solver must find an alternative representation to reach a solution. Suddenly the solution is
obtained and a solver experiences the affective “Aha!” response, resulting in insight as it
is traditionally defined.
In Experiments 1 and 2, the proportion of immediate-insight problems was much
greater than the proportion of delayed-insight problems. The II-S analysis revealed a very
similar pattern of activation as that seen in the I-S analysis. This is likely due to the large
number of immediate-insight problems blanketing the delayed-insight effect when the
two are averaged together. Because the I-S analysis contains a much larger number of
immediate-insight problems than delayed-insight problems Jung-Beeman et al. (2004)
and Subramaniam et al. (2009) likely also had a large number of immediate-insight
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problems in their analyses. In fact, Subramaniam and colleagues only gave participants
15 seconds to solve the problems, thus further restricting the possible amount of delayedinsight solutions. In fact, Subramaniam and colleagues and Kounios et al. (2006) report
insight reaction times of 6.57 and 5.84 seconds, respectively, with 15 second time limits
(comparable to the immediate-insight reaction times reported in this thesis). JungBeeman and colleagues report insight reaction times of 10.25 seconds, likely containing
somewhat more delayed-insight solutions than the other two studies due to the longer
time limit of 30 seconds. But nonetheless, if there were many immediate-insight solutions
in their analyses then activation patterns in their insight vs. search analyses would
resemble an immediate-insight effect as was found in this thesis.
The pattern of activation seen in the Subramaniam et al. (2009) study and the
pattern seen here in the I-S analysis are indeed similar. Also, an area near Jung-Beeman
and colleagues (2004) RH-aSTG region of interest was also seen here. If immediateinsight solutions are not insight solutions at all, then there must be some other
explanation for the differences seen between immediate-insight and search solutions.
During CRA problem solving people engage in a search. They first must read the
words to themselves (encoding). After encoding the problem words the person tries to
retrieve a word from declarative memory that is connected in some way to all three
problem words (relation). Upon reading the words, the information activates relevant
semantic networks (the guiding stage from Bowers et al., 1990) which constrains the
search space and guides the search. As relevant information passes a threshold of
activation an answer is generated (Bowers’ integrative stage) and consciously represented
as a hunch. The retrieval may seem special to the solver. It is of course sudden. This
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could be why participants rate these types of solutions as insight. The instructions given
to the participants stressed to rate a problem with insight when the “solution suddenly
pops into awareness and is obviously correct.” People would thus rate this type of
problem Insight. If they generated an answer immediately but had doubts about it’s
accuracy they may feel the need for further validation resulting in a response of search
(which occurred only occasionally – only ≈7% of all the correctly solved words).
Although II may require an intuitive judgment, the initial representation acquired
is the correct representation and, therefore, requires no cognitive restructuring. Because
no restructuring occurs there is no insight, as it is defined in this thesis. The conclusions,
hypotheses, and theories posed by Jung-Beeman et al. (2004), Subramaniam et al. (2009),
and Kounios et al. (2006) for how people acquire solutions by “insight” are not
inconsistent with the conclusions here that immediate-insight is simply intuition without
restructuring. A greater activation of the Cingulate Cortex, RH-aSTG/MTG, Parietal
Lobe, and the Fusiform area would be necessary to connect seemingly disparate ideas,
initially select the correct solution path, and to do it so quickly that the solver is surprised.
Interestingly, the results indicate the RH-aSTG/Inferior Frontal Gyrus may not be as
important for delayed-insight solutions as for immediate-insight solutions. This area may
be unique to immediate-insight solutions as found here and in prior studies.
The right Superior Frontal Gyrus showed greater activation for immediate-insight
solutions than search and greater search than delayed-insight early in the timecourse.
According to Anderson (2007), this is the area responsible for retrieval and storage
operations. Early in the problem solving process exercising greater retrieval efforts may
lead to immediate-insight solutions. Search solutions require some active retrieval
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mechanisms. Consistent with Pobric et al., 2008, that people solve insight problem much
more often without processing in the lateral Prefrontal Cortex, the decrease of activation
in the Frontal Lobe (more precisely, the right Superior Frontal Gyrus) for delayed-insight
solutions may be necessary to keep the problem from being overly constrained and allow
for a larger semantic network to be accessed.
According to Jung-Beeman and colleagues (2004), and accounting for increased
activation for immediate-insight in the RH-aSTG and MTG, processing in the right
hemisphere activates weakly connected words. As the correct word surpasses a threshold
of activation (even a very low threshold) it will be attended to due to greater activation in
the Cingulate Cortex, which has been implicated as a cognitive control mechanism that
monitors attentional resources and possibly switching attention to nonprepotent solution
candidates (Cole & Schneider, 2007; Kounios et al. 2006; Subramaniam et al., 2009), The
Precuneus has also been implicated in cognitive control and may be active as a result of
switching attention to the nonprepotent solution. Although, some studies have implicated
this region with planning motor movements and may be an artifact of the button press
that occurred right after solution (as indicated by the large peak signal at about 10
seconds; for a review of the behavioral correlates of the Precuneus, see Cavanna &
Trimble, 2006). According to Anderson (2007), as stated earlier, the Parietal Lobe is
implicated with forming representations of the problem and the Fusiform area is
implicated with focused processing of visually attended information and perceptual
recognition. The two areas would be needed to form a representation of the problem, but
one that is not overly constraining, and could possibly be involved with attending subtle
clues to coherence.
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Yarkoni, Speer, and Zacks (2008) associated the Inferior Frontal Gyrus with
semantic situation maintenance when reading connected rather than disconnected
sentences and decoding meaning from text. Greater activation for search, relative to
immediate-insight in the left Inferior Frontal Gyrus, Middle Temporal Gyrus, and
Superior Frontal Gyrus may be important for maintaining task relevant information
(Pobric et al., 2008) or retrieving information (Anderson, 2007) as the solver makes
connections between closely associated words. For immediate-insight, only one
connection is ever made, the solution, which is a correct connection between disparate
concepts. From this perspective, activation may be greater in the right Inferior Frontal
Gyrus and results in the connection of seemingly unrelated ideas. Stronger initial signal
in the right Superior Frontal Lobe may be greater for immediate-insight than search or
delayed-insight due to greater activation of search mechanisms supporting the retrieval
and connection between the seemingly related ideas. Other areas not mentioned are open
to interpretation. Immediate-insight seems to require a large portion of the right
hemisphere to intuitively make connections between disparate concepts. However, all this
happens without the need for restructuring and is therefore not something that is uniquely
associated with solving a problem with restructuring in insight. As a solver moves
steadily through the problem space, searching through words and testing them until
ultimately testing the correct word, they are likely only searching and testing them on one
of the problem words while leaving the other problem words alone. The result is a search
through seemingly connected ideas. From Bowden and Beeman (1998), this would occur
in the left hemisphere.
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Accordingly, delayed-insight solutions require some sort of restructuring to
switch from an initial incorrect representation to the final correct representation.
Examining the differences in patterns of activation between delayed-insight and search
should tell us more about the role of restructuring in insightful problem solving. For both
delayed-insight and search the problem solver must initially engage in a directed search
of the problem space. Like immediate-insight (and immediate-search) solutions, relevant
semantic networks are activated when the person encodes the problem words. If a
generated word is not automatically seen as correct (or is tested to be incorrect) then
alternative solution paths must be acquired. As a person searches the problem space they
may engage in hypothesis generation and testing. As more and more words are tested, the
number of possible candidates decreases, but with each incorrect candidate tested other
avenues must be traversed. As seen in Experiment 1, both search and delayed-insight
solutions require some type of restructuring (elaboration, re-encoding, or constraint
relaxation). The processing was very similar except that more restructuring occurred for
delayed-insight and a decision was made to rate the problem as insight.
If the pattern of activation seen in the I-S and II-S analyses does not show an
actual effect of restructuring and overcoming impasses then we must turn to the DI-S
analysis for clues to the nature of insight. The DI-S analysis revealed very little
difference between search and insight. Two areas showed a slightly larger peak signal for
delayed-insight earlier in the time-course data than search: the left posterior Middle
Temporal Gyrus and the right Parietal Lobe. There is large peak at two seconds after the
solution event in the left Middle Temporal Gyrus and a large peak at six seconds after the
solution event in the right Parietal Lobe. The explanation for this effect is that there is a
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need to re-represent the problem when the solution is unattainable and so the Parietal area
becomes more activated to transform the mental representation of problem (Anderson,
2007), which leads to a sudden awareness of the solution because the new representation
automatically elicits the answer.
The two marginally significant regions found were in the anterior Cingulate
Cortex and right Middle Temporal Gyrus. The two areas show a strong decrease in
activation at the same time the Parietal area peaks and large peaks two seconds
afterwards. The Cingulate Cortex has been implicated with control of action (Anderson,
2007; Cole & Schneider, 2007). The decrease in the Cingulate Cortex prior to solution
could possibly represent a decrease in cognitive control allowing for a re-representation
of the problem and loosening of constraints, allowing a new representation to be formed
and peaking again to solution as an affective “Aha!” response once the goal has been
achieved or. As a conflict monitor (Kounios et al., 2006; Subramaniam et al., 2009; Qiu
et al., 2008) the Cingulate Cortex may decrease in activation because there is no conflict
to monitor as a person may be at an impasse right before solution. Insight would thus
require a strict sequence of operations to succeed. A search solution would not require
such a pattern of activation because the representation at hand is sufficient to obtain a
solution. An alternative explanation to this assumption is that obtaining solution by
delayed-insight is no different than obtaining a solution by search and the results here are
illusory. Future successful replication of the present experiment would adequately prove
that this is not the case and delayed-insight solutions do in fact have different patterns of
activation than search solutions.
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Immediate-insight, without the need for cognitive restructuring, can be viewed as
intuition in the context of justification as outlined by Bowers et al. (1990). An intuitive
judgment can be formed without restructuring in insight. However, if the intuitive
judgment is incorrect then the person simply continues to search the problem space for an
alternative solution path. Both delayed-insight and search solutions require a guiding
towards coherence of the problem and an integration of plausible representations, as
Bowers describes. The difference between delayed-insight and search solutions may be in
validating the plausible representations as correct. Instructions given to the participants
did stress to give answers without spending time to verify they are correct. However, if
more time was spent validating solutions for search than delayed-insight, the actual time
that the solution became consciously accessible may differ between conditions. We
would thus see different patterns of activation than if the all solutions occurred at exactly
the same time before the button press. However, we cannot be sure. Better methods for
timing solution events would allow for better analyses of CRA problem solving.
All-in-all, we can be certain that immediate-insight solutions and delayed-insight
solutions show very different patterns of activation. While immediate-insight may require
some “special-process” as an intuitive judgment different from normal problem solving,
delayed-insight (or just “insight” as it is defined in this thesis) can be viewed as more
similar to “business-as-usual” (Davidson, 1995; Schooler et al., 1995) but under special
circumstances.
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the neural correlates of insight using
the Compound Remote Associate task. Insight was defined as a process of moving from
an initial state to a goal state, where the correct representation is discovered after
reaching an impasse and through a process of restructuring the solution appears as sudden
and surprising. Experiment 1 was designed to determine if CRA problems are in fact
insight problems and whether they can reliably used to study insight problem solving.
The results of Experiment 1 revealed that CRA problem can be used to investigate insight
and differences in processing may exist between two types of insight: immediate-insight,
where the initial path to solution is the correct path and leads immediately to solution,
and delayed-insight, where the initial path to solution is incorrect and the solution must
be obtained through a re-representation of the problem space. There are different insight
processes in CRA problems because the instructions given to participants to classify
problems as insight highlight the phenomenological “Aha!” experience. There appear to
be two types of solution processes that lead to this “Aha!” experience, and so the
conclusion of Experiment 1 is that researchers need to consider these differences in order
to effectively study the processes of insight.
Experiment 2 was designed to investigate the neural correlates of insight using the
CRA task while parsing insight into immediate-insight and delayed-insight. Experiment 2
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confirmed the results of Experiment 1 that there are two different types of insight.
Immediate-insight problems can be considered an intuitive response to stimuli involving
no method of restructuring. Future studies may further validate a difference between
immediate solutions and delayed solutions in general and whether successful immediateinsight processing differs from incorrect intuitive judgments. If there is no difference in
processing of correct and incorrect intuitive judgments then the pattern of activation for
making intuitive judgments can be viewed as a type of processing strategy which does
not rely on the accuracy of the information being retrieved. Rather, intuitive judgments
would be produced from unchecked, irresponsible processing. It would also be interesting
to find out if immediate-insight activation patterns and the activation pattern when saying
the first candidate of a search solution differ in any way, or if immediate-insight and
immediate search differ in any way. I do not suspect there would be.
Delayed-insight solutions must involve some kind of restructuring because
without restructuring the problem will not be suddenly obtained and deemed insightful.
Otherwise, the problem will remain unsolved or solved through normal search processes.
Delayed-insight solutions resemble analytical, search solution in terms of patterns of
activation. Both processes seem to rely on the same component processes necessary to
reach a solution. Although some differences in activation were observed. Therefore,
insight can be considered similar to “Business-as-usual” but a result of particularly
special patterns of processing in the short window of time just before solutions emerge.
Whether restructuring in insight is consciously mediated or occurs mostly unconsciously
(or both) is a topic for future debate. Future studies using hybrid insight problems may
benefit by determining whether these two methods for reaching a solution by insight exist
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for the type of problem being used. Future studies should use caution when using
problems in which solutions can be obtained immediately, as no restructuring may be
occurring. Future studies should instead focus on delayed-insight problems as a means
for uncovering the secrets of insight. For example, why are delayed-insight solutions
viewed by the solver as different from normal search solutions if they are so similar? A
better understanding of the reasons people give for solving problems with delayed-insight
and search may lead to a better understanding of the differences in activation patterns
seen between delayed-insight and search solutions. Along other lines of research, using
CRA problems to study intuitive judgments may prove fruitful. Also, future research on
insight should investigate whether insight and intuition utilize similar neuro-cognitive
resources.
In conclusion, CRA problems can and should be used to investigate insight. More
importantly, CRA problems should be used to investigate the role of immediate-insight,
or intuitive judgments, in problem solving. Delayed-insight problems should undergo
further testing to be certain they involve the same processing as search (particularly with
a larger sample). Due to the small number of delayed-insight solutions some important
differences between search and insight may not have been seen. Because there are so few
problems solved with delayed-insight when solving CRA problems, other types of
problems, that can still be solved fairly quickly but have much higher delayed-insight
solution proportions, should be considered as potentially better candidates for problems
to be used to investigate insight. Prior neuroimaging and behavioral research of insight
problem solving that are based on immediate-insight type responses should probably be
reformulated if there is in fact no restructuring occurring for these problems (i.e., Jung80

Beeman et al., 2004, Kounios et al., 2006, and Subramaniam et al., 2009, with CRA
problems, and any other studies using other types of problems that may contain
immediate-insight solutions).
Insight is best viewed as a normal function of problem solving that, when under
certain circumstances, seems to be a special phenomenon that results in an “Aha!”
experience. Ultimately, trying to solve problems with insight is not feasible. However,
something that is amenable is solving a problem with intuition. If we cannot teach people
to have more insight then maybe we can teach them to have more intuitive judgments and
to get to the solution as quickly and accurately as one can. I have thoroughly outlined
CRA problem solving in this thesis in an attempt to further elucidate the role of insight
and restructuring. Both the work put into this thesis and the phenomenon of insight can
best be summed up in the words written and performed by Jerry Garcia and the Grateful
Dead from the song “Truckin’”: “Sometimes the lights all shining on me/Other times I
can barely see/Lately it occurs to me/what a long, strange trip it’s been” (Hunter, Garcia,
Lesh, & Weir, 1970).
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APPENDIX A
PROBLEMS USED IN EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 2
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Table 8
Problems Used in Experiments 1 and 2

Word 1
rain
shock
force
pine
sleeping
basket
aid
river
off
cry
bottom
duck
control
mail
date
hound
print
show
worm
cross
dust
office
child
cast
nose
sage
cat
boot
light
health
wheel
rocking
blank
cottage
tomato
wise
sandwich
fur
lounge

Problems
Word 2
Word 3
test
stomach
shave
taste
line
mail
crab
sauce
bean
trash
eight
snow
rubber
wagon
note
account
military
first
front
ship
curve
hop
fold
dollar
place
rate
board
lung
alley
fold
pressure
shot
berry
bird
life
row
shelf
end
rain
tie
cereal
fish
mail
hat
scan
wash
side
jump
stone
bear
paint
hair
number
phone
summer
ground
birthday
stick
taker
less
hand
shopping
wheel
high
list
mate
swiss
cake
bomb
picker
work
tower
house
golf
rack
tail
hour
napkin

Answer
acid
after
air
apple
bag
ball
band
bank
base
battle
bell
bill
birth
black
blind
blood
blue
boat
book
bow
bowl
box
brain
broad
brown
brush
call
camp
candle
care
cart
chair
check
cheese
cherry
clock
club
coat
cocktail
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Experiment 1

Experiment 2
X

P

X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
P
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

P
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
P
P

X
X

X
X
P
P
X
P
X
X
X

Table 8 (continued)

Word 1
break
cut
sense
right
grass
dream
end
self
catcher
back
artist
shadow
lift
way
guy
teeth
nuclear
land
food
trip
eight
cracker
hold
preserve
time
piece
chamber
tail
flower
fish
bump
marshal
house
fight
hammer
fox
dew
french
cream
roll
note

Problems
Word 2
Word 3
bean
cake
cream
war
courtesy
place
cat
carbon
king
meat
break
light
line
lock
attorney
spending
food
hot
step
screen
hatch
route
chart
drop
card
mask
ground
weather
rain
down
arrest
start
feud
album
hand
house
forward
break
house
goal
skate
stick
fly
fighter
print
stool
ranger
tropical
blown
nelson
mind
dating
mask
natural
water
flood
friend
scout
mine
rush
egg
step
child
piano
thumb
pepper
control
machine
gear
hunter
man
peep
comb
bee
car
shoe
skate
water
bean
fish
chain
master

Answer
coffee
cold
common
copy
crab
day
dead
defense
dog
door
escape
eye
face
fair
fall
false
family
farm
fast
field
figure
fire
foot
forest
full
game
gas
gate
girl
gold
goose
grand
green
gun
head
hole
honey
horn
ice
jelly
key
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Experiment 1

Experiment 2
X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X
X
P
X

Table 8 (continued)

Word 1
reading
down
hungry
shine
pea
animal
fly
political
knife
officer
safety
peach
fork
foul
fence
pie
keg
over
line
horse
carpet
home
master
test
pet
mate
oil
water
mill
high
change
baby
home
dive
flake
opera
fountain
loser
cadet
wagon
iron

Problems
Word 2
Word 3
service
stick
question
check
order
belt
beam
struck
shell
chest
back
rat
clip
wall
surprise
line
light
pal
cash
larceny
cushion
point
arm
tar
dark
man
ground
mate
card
master
luck
belly
puff
room
plant
horse
fruit
drunk
human
drag
alert
ink
arm
room
toss
finger
runner
map
bottom
garden
shoes
total
bar
tuna
mine
shaker
tooth
dust
district
house
circuit
cake
spring
cap
sea
bed
light
rocket
mobile
cone
hand
dish
baking
pop
throat
spot
capsule
ship
break
radio
shovel
engine

Answer
lip
mark
money
moon
nut
pack
paper
party
pen
petty
pin
pit
pitch
play
post
pot
powder
power
punch
race
red
rest
ring
road
rock
running
salad
salt
saw
school
short
shower
sick
sky
snow
soap
soda
sore
space
station
steam
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Experiment 1

Experiment 2

X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X
E
X

X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
E
X

X
X
X
P
X

X
X
X
P
X
X

Table 8 (continued)
Problems
Word 1
Word 2
Word 3
Answer
Experiment 1
Experiment 2
pile
market
room
stock
age
mile
sand
stone
main
sweeper
light
street
X
X
cane
daddy
plum
sugar
X
X
wet
law
business
suit
X
dress
dial
flower
sun
X
X
man
glue
star
super
X
tooth
potato
heart
sweet
X
board
blade
back
switch
spoon
cloth
card
table
X
measure
worm
video
tape
X
X
illness
bus
computer
terminal
tank
hill
secret
top
X
rope
truck
line
tow
X
mouse
bear
sand
trap
X
palm
shoe
house
tree
X
X
pike
coat
signal
turn
X
X
cover
arm
wear
under
way
board
sleep
walk
P
P
night
wrist
stop
watch
X
type
ghost
screen
writer
X
X
Notes. E = Problem used as the example in the instructions. P = Problems used for
practice trials. X = Problems used for the experiment trials. Blank cells in “Experiment 2”
column represent problems used for the training portion of the experiment.
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CRA Instructions
1. “During the study you will be asked to solve a series of word puzzles. Each
puzzle consists of three words. Your task is to think of a single fourth word that
can be combined with each of the first three words to form a new compound word
or common phrase. For example, one puzzle might have three words: high,
district, and house. The answer to this puzzle would be school since you can
form the words high school, school district, and school house. Do you have any
questions?”
2. “You will see each problem for 30 seconds. As soon as you think you have an
answer make a response as quickly as possible. Please respond as quickly as
possible and report the answer you came up with, without spending time to verify
if it is correct. You should continue to work on a problem until you have an
answer or your time is up. When your time is up, the computer will present the
next problem.”
3. “After you say your answer to a problem, you will be asked to make a judgment
about how you solved it. You will be asked to either say the problem was solved
with insight, search (or noninsight in Experiment 1), or other. It is important you
understand what each rating means. A feeling of insight is a kind of “Aha!” as the
solution suddenly pops into awareness and is obviously correct. You may not be
sure how you came up with the answer, but you are relatively confident that it is
correct. So, using the “high, district, house” problem as an example, insight could
occur if you think of school at any point during solving efforts and school just
came to you all of the sudden. The answer seemed to come into your mind all at
once (You may exclaim: "It just popped into my head"; "Of course!"; "That's it!";
“Why didn't I think of that before?”; or "That's so obvious"). This feeling does not
have to be overwhelming, but should resemble what was just described. A search
rating is when you use a methodical hypothesis-testing approach. A methodical
search strategy is when you search for the answer by combining possible solutions
with each of the 3 problem words until you felt you have the correct solution. The
answer did not just pop into your head, and you felt you had to search for the
answer. Using the example from earlier, an example of a methodical search would
be to try words that could possibly fit, like “step”. Step would work with the word
“high” (high step) but not for “district” or “house”. You may then try a different
word like “roller” (high roller) but this word does not really fit with “district” or
“house” either. This “generate a word and then test it” strategy may continue until
you test the word “high” with school and can then verify that it works with the
other words as well. Sometimes you may start using a search strategy but then
you may suddenly see the correct answer. This would then be insight. A rating of
"other" means that either you did not know whether the solution was solved with
or without insight, you already knew the solution, or you just guessed. Do you
have any questions?”
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Coding Instructions
Fixation:
Simply record the number of NEW solution words generated per problem in the “New
Candidates” column.
Impasse:
G

Regenerating -- Generating the same solution candidate 2 or more times.

R

Rereading -- Rereading the problem words 3 or more times in succession without
generating a solution candidate.

D

Discontinuing -- Discontinuing work on the problem (completely stops solving
problem). This is when they start talking about something else, not relevant to
solving the problem.

N

No new -- Stops generating new solution words (“New Candidates”) for more
than 15 seconds from beginning of problem or more than 10 seconds between
problem solving attempts.

F

Frustration -- Exhibits clear emotional frustration (i.e., statements such as: “I
don't know…”, “I can't think…”, “This is hard…”, “I hate this…”, “oh gosh…”,
or something similar demonstrating that they can't find a solution or the task is
hard).

Restructuring:
E

Elaboration -- Switching to a different meaning of a problem word (e.g., Going
from “star” like in the sky to a “star” like a person -- movie star/film star).

R

Reencoding -- Switching to a different problem word to try and find a solution
(e.g., For the problem row/show/life, this would be like someone using row to
find a solution, then switching to either show or life to try and find a solution.)

C

Constraint Relaxation -- Switching the method of solving the problem, or
changing what the goal is. This is when the person doesn't know how to do the
problem so is trying something totally wrong, but then figures it out that three
compound words can be made from a single solution word or clearly states that
they are looking for words that go before/after a certain problem word after trying
to find words that come after/before that problem word.

*Code using the letter that is to the left of each description and record in appropriate
columns.
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